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// Copyright Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
//! Default provider for Address Validation tokens
//!
//! The default provider will randomly generate a 256 bit key. This key will be used to sign and
//! verify tokens. The key can be rotated at a duration set by the user.
//!
//! The default provider does not support tokens delivered in a NEW_TOKEN frame.
use core::{mem::size_of, time::Duration};
use hash_hasher::HashHasher;
use s2n_codec::{DecoderBuffer, DecoderBufferMut};
use s2n_quic_core::{
connection, event::api::SocketAddress, random, time::Timestamp, token::Source,
};
use s2n_quic_crypto::{constant_time, digest, hmac};
use std::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes, FromZeroes, Unaligned};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;
struct BaseKey {
active_duration: Duration,
// HMAC key for signing and verifying
key: Option<(Timestamp, hmac::Key)>,
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//# To protect against such attacks, servers MUST ensure that
//# replay of tokens is prevented or limited.
duplicate_filter: cuckoofilter::CuckooFilter<HashHasher>,
}
impl BaseKey {
pub fn new(active_duration: Duration) -> Self {
Self {
active_duration,
key: None,
duplicate_filter: cuckoofilter::CuckooFilter::with_capacity(
cuckoofilter::DEFAULT_CAPACITY,
),
}
}
pub fn hasher(&mut self, random: &mut dyn random::Generator) -> Option<hmac::Context> {
let key = self.poll_key(random)?;
Some(hmac::Context::with_key(&key))
}
fn poll_key(&mut self, random: &mut dyn random::Generator) -> Option<hmac::Key> {
let now = s2n_quic_platform::time::now();
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-21.3
//# Servers SHOULD provide mitigations for this attack by limiting the
//# usage and lifetime of address validation tokens; see Section 8.1.3.
if let Some((expires_at, key)) = self.key.as_ref() {
if expires_at > &now {
// key is still valid
return Some(key.clone());
}
}
let expires_at = now.checked_add(self.active_duration)?;
// TODO in addition to generating new key material, clear out the filter used for detecting
// duplicates.
let mut key_material = Zeroizing::new([0; digest::SHA256_OUTPUT_LEN]);
random.private_random_fill(&mut key_material[..]);
let key = hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, key_material.as_ref());
// TODO clear the filter instead of recreating. This is pending a merge to crates.io
// (https://github.com/axiomhq/rust-cuckoofilter/pull/52)
self.duplicate_filter =
cuckoofilter::CuckooFilter::with_capacity(cuckoofilter::DEFAULT_CAPACITY);
self.key = Some((expires_at, key));
self.key.as_ref().map(|key| key.1.clone())
}
}
const DEFAULT_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD: Duration = Duration::from_millis(1000);
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Provider {
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//# Thus, a token SHOULD have an
//# expiration time, which could be either an explicit expiration time or
//# an issued timestamp that can be used to dynamically calculate the
//# expiration time.
/// To fulfill this SHOULD, we rotate the key periodically. This allows
/// customers to control the token lifetime without adding bytes to the token itself.
key_rotation_period: Duration,
}
impl Default for Provider {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
key_rotation_period: DEFAULT_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD,
}
}
}
impl super::Provider for Provider {
type Format = Format;
type Error = core::convert::Infallible;
fn start(self) -> Result<Self::Format, Self::Error> {
// The keys must remain valid for two rotation periods or they will regenerate their
// material and validation will fail.
let format = Format {
key_rotation_period: self.key_rotation_period,
current_key_rotates_at: s2n_quic_platform::time::now(),
current_key: 0,
keys: [
BaseKey::new(self.key_rotation_period * 2),
BaseKey::new(self.key_rotation_period * 2),
],
};
Ok(format)
}
}
pub struct Format {
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//= type=exception
//= reason=We use a duplicate filter to prevent tokens from being used more than once.
//# Servers are encouraged to allow tokens to be used only
//# once, if possible; tokens MAY include additional information about
//# clients to further narrow applicability or reuse.
/// Key validity period
key_rotation_period: Duration,
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//# Servers SHOULD ensure that
//# tokens sent in Retry packets are only accepted for a short time.
/// Timestamp to rotate current key
current_key_rotates_at: s2n_quic_core::time::Timestamp,
/// Which key is used to sign
current_key: u8,
/// Key used to sign keys
keys: [BaseKey; 2],
}
impl Format {
fn current_key(&mut self) -> u8 {
let now = s2n_quic_platform::time::now();
if now > self.current_key_rotates_at {
self.current_key ^= 1;
self.current_key_rotates_at = now + self.key_rotation_period;
// TODO either clear the duplicate filter here, or implement in the BaseKey logic
// https://github.com/aws/s2n-quic/issues/173
}
self.current_key
}
// Retry Tokens need to include the original destination connection id from the transport
// parameters. This OCID is included in the tag.
fn tag_retry_token(
&mut self,
token: &Token,
context: &mut super::Context<'_>,
) -> Option<hmac::Tag> {
let mut ctx = self.keys[token.header.key_id() as usize].hasher(context.random)?;
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//# Tokens
//# sent in Retry packets SHOULD include information that allows the
//# server to verify that the source IP address and port in client
//# packets remain constant.
ctx.update(&token.original_destination_connection_id);
ctx.update(&token.nonce);
ctx.update(context.peer_connection_id);
match context.remote_address {
SocketAddress::IpV4 { ip, port, .. } => {
ctx.update(ip);
ctx.update(&port.to_be_bytes());
}
SocketAddress::IpV6 { ip, port, .. } => {
ctx.update(ip);
ctx.update(&port.to_be_bytes());
}
_ => {
// we are unable to hash the address so bail
return None;
}
};
Some(ctx.sign())
}
// Using the key id in the token, verify the token
fn validate_retry_token(
&mut self,
context: &mut super::Context<'_>,
token: &Token,
) -> Option<connection::InitialId> {
if self.keys[token.header.key_id() as usize]
.duplicate_filter
.contains(token)
{
return None;
}
let tag = self.tag_retry_token(token, context)?;
if constant_time::verify_slices_are_equal(&token.hmac, tag.as_ref()).is_ok() {
// Only add the token once it has been validated. This will prevent the filter from
// being filled with garbage tokens.
// Ignore the outcome of adding a token to the filter because we always want to
// continue the connection if the filter fails.
let _ = self.keys[token.header.key_id() as usize]
.duplicate_filter
.add(token);
return token.original_destination_connection_id();
}
None
}
}
impl super::Format for Format {
const TOKEN_LEN: usize = size_of::<Token>();
/// The default provider does not support NEW_TOKEN frame tokens
fn generate_new_token(
&mut self,
_context: &mut super::Context<'_>,
_source_connection_id: &connection::LocalId,
_output_buffer: &mut [u8],
) -> Option<()> {
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//= type=TODO
//= tracking-issue=418
//# A server MAY provide clients with an address validation token during
//# one connection that can be used on a subsequent connection.
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//= type=TODO
//= tracking-issue=346
//# Tokens sent in NEW_TOKEN frames MUST include information that allows
//# the server to verify that the client IP address has not changed from
//# when the token was issued.
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//= type=TODO
//= tracking-issue=345
//# A token issued with NEW_TOKEN MUST NOT include information that would
//# allow values to be linked by an observer to the connection on which
//# it was issued.
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//= type=TODO
//= tracking-issue=387
//# A server MUST ensure that every NEW_TOKEN frame it sends
//# is unique across all clients, with the exception of those sent to
//# repair losses of previously sent NEW_TOKEN frames.
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//= type=TODO
//= tracking-issue=394
//# A server MAY provide clients with an address validation token during
//# one connection that can be used on a subsequent connection.
None
}
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.2
//# Requiring the server
//# to provide a different connection ID, along with the
//# original_destination_connection_id transport parameter defined in
//# Section 18.2, forces the server to demonstrate that it, or an entity
//# it cooperates with, received the original Initial packet from the
//# client.
fn generate_retry_token(
&mut self,
context: &mut super::Context<'_>,
original_destination_connection_id: &connection::InitialId,
output_buffer: &mut [u8],
) -> Option<()> {
let buffer = DecoderBufferMut::new(output_buffer);
let (token, _) = buffer
.decode::<&mut Token>()
.expect("Provided output buffer did not match TOKEN_LEN");
let header = Header::new(Source::RetryPacket, self.current_key());
token.header = header;
token.original_destination_connection_id[..original_destination_connection_id.len()]
.copy_from_slice(original_destination_connection_id.as_bytes());
token.odcid_len = original_destination_connection_id.len() as u8;
// ensure the other CID bytes are zeroed out
for b in token
.original_destination_connection_id
.iter_mut()
.skip(original_destination_connection_id.len())
{
*b = 0;
}
// Populate the nonce before signing
context.random.public_random_fill(&mut token.nonce[..]);
let tag = self.tag_retry_token(token, context)?;
token.hmac.copy_from_slice(tag.as_ref());
Some(())
}
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//# When a server receives an Initial packet with an address validation
//# token, it MUST attempt to validate the token, unless it has already
//# completed address validation.
fn validate_token(
&mut self,
context: &mut super::Context<'_>,
token: &[u8],
) -> Option<connection::InitialId> {
let buffer = DecoderBuffer::new(token);
let (token, remaining) = buffer.decode::<&Token>().ok()?;
// Verify the provided token doesn't have any additional data
remaining.ensure_empty().ok()?;
if token.header.version() != TOKEN_VERSION {
return None;
}
let source = token.header.token_source();
match source {
Source::RetryPacket => self.validate_retry_token(context, token),
Source::NewTokenFrame => None, // Not supported in the default provider
}
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//= type=TODO
//= tracking-issue=347
//# Tokens that are provided
//# in NEW_TOKEN frames (Section 19.7) need to be valid for longer but
//# SHOULD NOT be accepted multiple times.
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//= type=TODO
//= tracking-issue=388
//# Clients that want to break continuity of identity with a server can
//# discard tokens provided using the NEW_TOKEN frame.
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, FromBytes, FromZeroes, AsBytes, Unaligned)]
#[repr(C)]
pub(crate) struct Header(u8);
const TOKEN_VERSION: u8 = 0x00;
const VERSION_SHIFT: u8 = 7;
const VERSION_MASK: u8 = 0x80;
const TOKEN_SOURCE_SHIFT: u8 = 6;
const TOKEN_SOURCE_MASK: u8 = 0x40;
const KEY_ID_SHIFT: u8 = 5;
const KEY_ID_MASK: u8 = 0x20;
impl Header {
fn new(source: Source, key_id: u8) -> Header {
let mut header: u8 = 0;
header |= TOKEN_VERSION << VERSION_SHIFT;
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//# Information that
//# allows the server to distinguish between tokens from Retry and
//# NEW_TOKEN MAY be accessible to entities other than the server.
header |= match source {
Source::NewTokenFrame => 0 << TOKEN_SOURCE_SHIFT,
Source::RetryPacket => 1 << TOKEN_SOURCE_SHIFT,
};
// The key_id can only be 0 or 1
debug_assert!(key_id <= 1);
header |= (key_id & 0x01) << KEY_ID_SHIFT;
Header(header)
}
fn version(self) -> u8 {
(self.0 & VERSION_MASK) >> VERSION_SHIFT
}
fn key_id(self) -> u8 {
(self.0 & KEY_ID_MASK) >> KEY_ID_SHIFT
}
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.1
//# A token sent in a NEW_TOKEN frame or a Retry packet MUST be
//# constructed in a way that allows the server to identify how it was
//# provided to a client. These tokens are carried in the same field but
//# require different handling from servers.
fn token_source(self) -> Source {
match (self.0 & TOKEN_SOURCE_MASK) >> TOKEN_SOURCE_SHIFT {
0 => Source::NewTokenFrame,
1 => Source::RetryPacket,
_ => Source::NewTokenFrame,
}
}
}
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//# There is no need for a single well-defined format for the token
//# because the server that generates the token also consumes it.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, FromBytes, FromZeroes, AsBytes, Unaligned)]
#[repr(C)]
struct Token {
header: Header,
odcid_len: u8,
original_destination_connection_id: [u8; 20],
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//# An address validation token MUST be difficult to guess. Including a
//# random value with at least 128 bits of entropy in the token would be
//# sufficient, but this depends on the server remembering the value it
//# sends to clients.
nonce: [u8; 32],
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//# A token-based scheme allows the server to offload any state
//# associated with validation to the client. For this design to work,
//# the token MUST be covered by integrity protection against
//# modification or falsification by clients. Without integrity
//# protection, malicious clients could generate or guess values for
//# tokens that would be accepted by the server. Only the server
//# requires access to the integrity protection key for tokens.
hmac: [u8; 32],
}
s2n_codec::zerocopy_value_codec!(Token);
impl Hash for Token {
/// Token hashes are taken from the hmac
fn hash<H: Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) {
state.write(&self.hmac);
}
}
impl Token {
pub fn original_destination_connection_id(&self) -> Option<connection::InitialId> {
let dcid = self
.original_destination_connection_id
.get(..self.odcid_len as usize)?;
connection::InitialId::try_from_bytes(dcid)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use s2n_quic_core::{
inet::SocketAddress,
random,
token::{Context, Format as FormatTrait, Source},
};
use s2n_quic_platform::time;
use std::{net::SocketAddr, sync::Arc};
const TEST_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD: Duration = Duration::from_millis(1000);
fn get_test_format() -> Format {
Format {
key_rotation_period: TEST_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD,
keys: [
BaseKey::new(TEST_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD * 2),
BaseKey::new(TEST_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD * 2),
],
current_key_rotates_at: time::now(),
current_key: 0,
}
}
#[test]
fn test_header() {
// Test all combinations of values to create a header and verify the header returns the
// expected values.
for source in &[Source::NewTokenFrame, Source::RetryPacket] {
for key_id in [0, 1] {
let header = Header::new(*source, key_id);
// The version should always be the constant TOKEN_VERSION
assert_eq!(header.version(), TOKEN_VERSION);
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.1
//= type=test
//# A token sent in a NEW_TOKEN frames or a Retry packet MUST be
//# constructed in a way that allows the server to identify how it was
//# provided to a client.
assert_eq!(header.token_source(), *source);
assert_eq!(header.key_id(), key_id);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn test_valid_retry_tokens() {
let clock = Arc::new(time::testing::MockClock::new());
time::testing::set_local_clock(clock.clone());
let mut format = get_test_format();
let first_conn_id = connection::PeerId::try_from_bytes(&[2, 4, 6, 8, 10]).unwrap();
let second_conn_id = connection::PeerId::try_from_bytes(&[1, 3, 5, 7, 9]).unwrap();
let orig_conn_id =
connection::InitialId::try_from_bytes(&[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]).unwrap();
let addr = SocketAddress::default();
let mut first_token = [0; Format::TOKEN_LEN];
let mut second_token = [0; Format::TOKEN_LEN];
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&addr, &first_conn_id, &mut random);
// Generate two tokens for different connections
format
.generate_retry_token(&mut context, &orig_conn_id, &mut first_token)
.unwrap();
context = Context::new(&addr, &second_conn_id, &mut random);
format
.generate_retry_token(&mut context, &orig_conn_id, &mut second_token)
.unwrap();
clock.adjust_by(TEST_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD);
context = Context::new(&addr, &first_conn_id, &mut random);
assert_eq!(
format.validate_token(&mut context, &first_token),
Some(orig_conn_id)
);
context = Context::new(&addr, &second_conn_id, &mut random);
assert_eq!(
format.validate_token(&mut context, &second_token),
Some(orig_conn_id)
);
context = Context::new(&addr, &first_conn_id, &mut random);
assert_eq!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &second_token), None);
}
#[test]
fn test_retry_ip_port_validation() {
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//= type=test
//# Tokens
//# sent in Retry packets SHOULD include information that allows the
//# server to verify that the source IP address and port in client
//# packets remain constant.
let mut format = get_test_format();
let conn_id = connection::PeerId::try_from_bytes(&[2, 4, 6, 8, 10]).unwrap();
let orig_conn_id =
connection::InitialId::try_from_bytes(&[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]).unwrap();
let mut token = [0; Format::TOKEN_LEN];
let ip_address = "127.0.0.1:443";
let addr: SocketAddr = ip_address.parse().unwrap();
let correct_address: SocketAddress = addr.into();
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&correct_address, &conn_id, &mut random);
format
.generate_retry_token(&mut context, &orig_conn_id, &mut token)
.unwrap();
let ip_address = "127.0.0.2:443";
let addr: SocketAddr = ip_address.parse().unwrap();
let incorrect_address: SocketAddress = addr.into();
context = Context::new(&incorrect_address, &conn_id, &mut random);
assert_eq!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &token), None);
let ip_address = "127.0.0.1:444";
let addr: SocketAddr = ip_address.parse().unwrap();
let incorrect_port: SocketAddress = addr.into();
context = Context::new(&incorrect_port, &conn_id, &mut random);
assert_eq!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &token), None);
// Verify the token is still valid after the failed attempts
context = Context::new(&correct_address, &conn_id, &mut random);
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &token).is_some());
}
#[test]
fn test_key_rotation() {
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.3
//= type=test
//# Thus, a token SHOULD have an
//# expiration time, which could be either an explicit expiration time or
//# an issued timestamp that can be used to dynamically calculate the
//# expiration time.
let clock = Arc::new(time::testing::MockClock::new());
time::testing::set_local_clock(clock.clone());
let mut format = get_test_format();
let conn_id = connection::PeerId::TEST_ID;
let orig_conn_id = connection::InitialId::TEST_ID;
let addr = SocketAddress::default();
let mut buf = [0; Format::TOKEN_LEN];
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&addr, &conn_id, &mut random);
format
.generate_retry_token(&mut context, &orig_conn_id, &mut buf)
.unwrap();
// Validation should succeed because the signing key is still valid, even
// though it has been rotated from the current signing key
clock.adjust_by(TEST_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD);
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &buf).is_some());
// Validation should fail because the key used for signing has been regenerated
clock.adjust_by(TEST_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD);
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &buf).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_expired_retry_token() {
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//= type=test
//# Servers SHOULD ensure that
//# tokens sent in Retry packets are only accepted for a short time.
let clock = Arc::new(time::testing::MockClock::new());
time::testing::set_local_clock(clock.clone());
let mut format = get_test_format();
let conn_id = connection::PeerId::TEST_ID;
let orig_conn_id = connection::InitialId::TEST_ID;
let addr = SocketAddress::default();
let mut buf = [0; Format::TOKEN_LEN];
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&addr, &conn_id, &mut random);
format
.generate_retry_token(&mut context, &orig_conn_id, &mut buf)
.unwrap();
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-21.3
//= type=test
//# Servers SHOULD provide mitigations for this attack by limiting the
//# usage and lifetime of address validation tokens; see Section 8.1.3.
// Validation should fail because multiple rotation periods have elapsed
clock.adjust_by(TEST_KEY_ROTATION_PERIOD * 2);
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &buf).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_retry_validation_default_format() {
let clock = Arc::new(time::testing::MockClock::new());
time::testing::set_local_clock(clock);
let mut format = get_test_format();
let conn_id = connection::PeerId::TEST_ID;
let odcid = connection::InitialId::try_from_bytes(&[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]).unwrap();
let addr = SocketAddress::default();
let mut buf = [0; Format::TOKEN_LEN];
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&addr, &conn_id, &mut random);
format
.generate_retry_token(&mut context, &odcid, &mut buf)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &buf), Some(odcid));
let wrong_conn_id = connection::PeerId::try_from_bytes(&[0, 1, 2]).unwrap();
context = Context::new(&addr, &wrong_conn_id, &mut random);
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &buf).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_duplicate_token_detection() {
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//= type=test
//# To protect against such attacks, servers MUST ensure that
//# replay of tokens is prevented or limited.
let mut format = get_test_format();
let conn_id = connection::PeerId::TEST_ID;
let odcid = connection::InitialId::try_from_bytes(&[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]).unwrap();
let addr = SocketAddress::default();
let mut buf = [0; Format::TOKEN_LEN];
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&addr, &conn_id, &mut random);
format
.generate_retry_token(&mut context, &odcid, &mut buf)
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &buf), Some(odcid));
// Second attempt with the same token should fail because the token is a duplicate
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &buf).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_token_modification_detection() {
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//= type=test
//# For this design to work,
//# the token MUST be covered by integrity protection against
//# modification or falsification by clients.
let mut format = get_test_format();
let conn_id = connection::PeerId::try_from_bytes(&[2, 4, 6, 8, 10]).unwrap();
let orig_conn_id =
connection::InitialId::try_from_bytes(&[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]).unwrap();
let addr = SocketAddress::default();
let mut token = [0; Format::TOKEN_LEN];
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&addr, &conn_id, &mut random);
// Generate two tokens for different connections
format
.generate_retry_token(&mut context, &orig_conn_id, &mut token)
.unwrap();
for i in 0..Format::TOKEN_LEN {
random = random::testing::Generator(5);
context = Context::new(&addr, &conn_id, &mut random);
token[i] = !token[i];
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, &token).is_none());
token[i] = !token[i];
}
}
#[test]
fn test_token_length_check() {
let mut format = get_test_format();
let conn_id = connection::PeerId::try_from_bytes(&[2, 4, 6, 8, 10]).unwrap();
let addr = SocketAddress::default();
bolero::check!().for_each(move |token| {
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&addr, &conn_id, &mut random);
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, token).is_none())
});
}
#[test]
fn test_token_falsification_detection() {
let mut format = get_test_format();
let conn_id = connection::PeerId::try_from_bytes(&[2, 4, 6, 8, 10]).unwrap();
let addr = SocketAddress::default();
//= https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000#section-8.1.4
//= type=test
//# For this design to work,
//# the token MUST be covered by integrity protection against
//# modification or falsification by clients.
let generator = bolero::generator::gen::<Vec<u8>>()
.with()
.len(Format::TOKEN_LEN);
bolero::check!()
.with_generator(generator)
.for_each(move |token| {
let mut random = random::testing::Generator(5);
let mut context = Context::new(&addr, &conn_id, &mut random);
assert!(format.validate_token(&mut context, token).is_none())
});
}
}