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// MIT License
// Copyright (c) 2020-2023 The orion Developers
// Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
// of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
// in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
// to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
// copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
// furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
// The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
// all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
// IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
// FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
// AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
// LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
// OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
// SOFTWARE.
//! Authenticated secret-key encryption.
//!
//! # Use case:
//! `orion::aead` can be used to encrypt data in a way that detects if the
//! encrypted data has been tampered with before decrypting it.
//!
//! An example of this could be sending messages across networks, where
//! confidentiality and authenticity of these messages is required.
//!
//! # About:
//! - Both one-shot functions and a [`streaming`] API are provided.
//! - The nonce is automatically generated.
//! - Returns a vector where the first 24 bytes are the nonce and the rest is
//! the authenticated ciphertext with the last 16 bytes being the corresponding Poly1305 tag.
//! - Uses XChaCha20Poly1305 with no additional data.
//! - When using [`seal`] and [`open`] then the separation of tags, nonces and
//! ciphertext are automatically handled.
//!
//! # Parameters:
//! - `plaintext`: The data to be encrypted.
//! - `secret_key`: The secret key used to encrypt the `plaintext`.
//! - `ciphertext_with_tag_and_nonce`: The data to be decrypted with the first
//! 24 bytes being the nonce and the last 16 bytes being the corresponding Poly1305 tag.
//!
//! # Errors:
//! An error will be returned if:
//! - `secret_key` is not 32 bytes.
//! - The `plaintext` is empty.
//! - `ciphertext_with_tag_and_nonce` is less than 41 bytes
//! ([`XCHACHA_NONCESIZE`] + [`POLY1305_OUTSIZE`] + 1).
//! - The received tag does not match the calculated tag when calling [`open`].
//! - `plaintext.len()` + [`XCHACHA_NONCESIZE`] + [`POLY1305_OUTSIZE`] overflows when calling [`seal`].
//!
//! # Panics:
//! A panic will occur if:
//! - More than 2^32-1 * 64 bytes of data are processed.
//! - Failure to generate random bytes securely.
//!
//! # Security:
//! - It is critical for security that a given nonce is not re-used with a given
//! key. Should this happen,
//! the security of all data that has been encrypted with that given key is
//! compromised.
//! - To securely generate a strong key, use [`SecretKey::default()`].
//! - The length of the `plaintext` is not hidden, only its contents.
//!
//! # Example:
//! ```rust
//! use orion::aead;
//!
//! let secret_key = aead::SecretKey::default();
//! let ciphertext = aead::seal(&secret_key, b"Secret message")?;
//! let decrypted_data = aead::open(&secret_key, &ciphertext)?;
//!
//! assert_eq!(decrypted_data, b"Secret message");
//! # Ok::<(), orion::errors::UnknownCryptoError>(())
//! ```
#![cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(feature = "safe_api")))]
pub use super::hltypes::SecretKey;
use crate::{
errors::UnknownCryptoError,
hazardous::{
aead,
mac::poly1305::POLY1305_OUTSIZE,
stream::{
chacha20,
xchacha20::{Nonce, XCHACHA_NONCESIZE},
},
},
};
#[must_use = "SECURITY WARNING: Ignoring a Result can have real security implications."]
/// Authenticated encryption using XChaCha20Poly1305.
pub fn seal(secret_key: &SecretKey, plaintext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnknownCryptoError> {
if plaintext.is_empty() {
return Err(UnknownCryptoError);
}
let out_len = match plaintext
.len()
.checked_add(XCHACHA_NONCESIZE + POLY1305_OUTSIZE)
{
Some(min_out_len) => min_out_len,
None => return Err(UnknownCryptoError),
};
let mut dst_out = vec![0u8; out_len];
let nonce = Nonce::generate();
dst_out[..XCHACHA_NONCESIZE].copy_from_slice(nonce.as_ref());
aead::xchacha20poly1305::seal(
&chacha20::SecretKey::from_slice(secret_key.unprotected_as_bytes())?,
&nonce,
plaintext,
None,
&mut dst_out[XCHACHA_NONCESIZE..],
)?;
Ok(dst_out)
}
#[must_use = "SECURITY WARNING: Ignoring a Result can have real security implications."]
/// Authenticated decryption using XChaCha20Poly1305.
pub fn open(
secret_key: &SecretKey,
ciphertext_with_tag_and_nonce: &[u8],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnknownCryptoError> {
// Avoid empty ciphertexts
if ciphertext_with_tag_and_nonce.len() <= (XCHACHA_NONCESIZE + POLY1305_OUTSIZE) {
return Err(UnknownCryptoError);
}
let mut dst_out =
vec![0u8; ciphertext_with_tag_and_nonce.len() - (XCHACHA_NONCESIZE + POLY1305_OUTSIZE)];
aead::xchacha20poly1305::open(
&chacha20::SecretKey::from_slice(secret_key.unprotected_as_bytes())?,
&Nonce::from_slice(&ciphertext_with_tag_and_nonce[..XCHACHA_NONCESIZE])?,
&ciphertext_with_tag_and_nonce[XCHACHA_NONCESIZE..],
None,
&mut dst_out,
)?;
Ok(dst_out)
}
pub mod streaming {
//! Streaming AEAD based on XChaCha20Poly1305.
//!
//! # Use case:
//! This can be used to encrypt and authenticate a stream of data. It prevents the
//! modification, reordering, dropping or duplication of messages. Nonce management is handled automatically.
//!
//! An example of this could be the encryption of files that are too large to encrypt in one piece.
//!
//! # About:
//! This implementation is based on and compatible with the ["secretstream" API] of libsodium.
//!
//! # Parameters:
//! - `secret_key`: The secret key.
//! - `nonce`: The nonce value.
//! - `plaintext`: The data to be encrypted.
//! - `ciphertext`: The encrypted data with a Poly1305 tag and a [`StreamTag`] indicating its function.
//! - `tag`: Indicates the type of message. The `tag` is a part of the output when encrypting. It
//! is encrypted and authenticated.
//!
//! # Errors:
//! An error will be returned if:
//! - `secret_key` is not 32 bytes.
//! - The length of `ciphertext` is not at least [`ABYTES`].
//! - The received mac does not match the calculated mac when decrypting. This can indicate
//! a dropped or reordered message within the stream.
//! - More than 2^32-3 * 64 bytes of data are processed when encrypting/decrypting a single chunk.
//! - [`ABYTES`] + `plaintext.len()` overflows when encrypting.
//!
//! # Panics:
//! A panic will occur if:
//! - 64 + (`ciphertext.len()` - [`ABYTES`]) overflows when decrypting.
//! - Failure to generate random bytes securely.
//!
//! # Security:
//! - It is critical for security that a given nonce is not re-used with a given
//! key.
//! - To securely generate a strong key, use [`SecretKey::generate()`].
//! - The length of the messages is leaked.
//! - It is recommended to use `StreamTag::Finish` as tag for the last message. This allows the
//! decrypting side to detect if messages at the end of the stream are lost.
//!
//! # Example:
//! ```rust
//! use orion::aead::streaming::*;
//! use orion::aead::SecretKey;
//!
//! let chunk_size: usize = 128; // The size of the chunks you wish to split the stream into.
//! let src = [255u8; 4096]; // Some example input stream.
//! let mut out: Vec<Vec<u8>> = Vec::with_capacity(4096 / 128);
//!
//! let secret_key = SecretKey::default();
//!
//! // Encryption:
//! let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&secret_key)?;
//!
//! for (n_chunk, src_chunk) in src.chunks(chunk_size).enumerate() {
//! let encrypted_chunk =
//! if src_chunk.len() != chunk_size || n_chunk + 1 == src.len() / chunk_size {
//! // We've reached the end of the input source,
//! // so we mark it with the Finish tag.
//! sealer.seal_chunk(src_chunk, &StreamTag::Finish)?
//! } else {
//! // Just a normal chunk
//! sealer.seal_chunk(src_chunk, &StreamTag::Message)?
//! };
//! // Save the encrypted chunk somewhere
//! out.push(encrypted_chunk);
//! }
//!
//! // Decryption:
//! let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&secret_key, &nonce)?;
//!
//! for (n_chunk, src_chunk) in out.iter().enumerate() {
//! let (_decrypted_chunk, tag) = opener.open_chunk(src_chunk)?;
//!
//! if src_chunk.len() != chunk_size + ABYTES || n_chunk + 1 == out.len() {
//! // We've reached the end of the input source,
//! // so we check if the last chunk is also set as Finish.
//! assert_eq!(tag, StreamTag::Finish, "Stream has been truncated!");
//! }
//! }
//!
//! # Ok::<(), orion::errors::UnknownCryptoError>(())
//! ```
//! [`ABYTES`]: crate::hazardous::aead::streaming::ABYTES
//! [`StreamTag`]: crate::hazardous::aead::streaming::StreamTag
//! [`SecretKey::generate()`]: super::SecretKey::generate
//! ["secretstream" API]: https://download.libsodium.org/doc/secret-key_cryptography/secretstream
use super::*;
pub use crate::hazardous::aead::streaming::Nonce;
pub use crate::hazardous::aead::streaming::StreamTag;
pub use crate::hazardous::aead::streaming::ABYTES;
#[derive(Debug)]
/// Streaming authenticated encryption.
pub struct StreamSealer {
internal_sealer: aead::streaming::StreamXChaCha20Poly1305,
}
impl StreamSealer {
#[must_use = "SECURITY WARNING: Ignoring a Result can have real security implications."]
/// Initialize a `StreamSealer` struct with a given key.
pub fn new(secret_key: &SecretKey) -> Result<(Self, Nonce), UnknownCryptoError> {
let nonce = Nonce::generate();
let sk = &aead::streaming::SecretKey::from_slice(secret_key.unprotected_as_bytes())?;
let sealer = Self {
internal_sealer: aead::streaming::StreamXChaCha20Poly1305::new(sk, &nonce),
};
Ok((sealer, nonce))
}
#[must_use = "SECURITY WARNING: Ignoring a Result can have real security implications."]
/// Encrypts `plaintext`. The `StreamTag` indicates the type of message.
pub fn seal_chunk(
&mut self,
plaintext: &[u8],
tag: &StreamTag,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, UnknownCryptoError> {
let sealed_chunk_len = plaintext.len().checked_add(ABYTES);
if sealed_chunk_len.is_none() {
return Err(UnknownCryptoError);
}
let mut sealed_chunk = vec![0u8; sealed_chunk_len.unwrap()];
self.internal_sealer
.seal_chunk(plaintext, None, &mut sealed_chunk, tag)?;
Ok(sealed_chunk)
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
/// Streaming authenticated decryption.
pub struct StreamOpener {
internal_sealer: aead::streaming::StreamXChaCha20Poly1305,
}
impl StreamOpener {
#[must_use = "SECURITY WARNING: Ignoring a Result can have real security implications."]
/// Initialize a `StreamOpener` struct with a given key and nonce.
pub fn new(secret_key: &SecretKey, nonce: &Nonce) -> Result<Self, UnknownCryptoError> {
let sk = &chacha20::SecretKey::from_slice(secret_key.unprotected_as_bytes())?;
Ok(Self {
internal_sealer: aead::streaming::StreamXChaCha20Poly1305::new(sk, nonce),
})
}
#[must_use = "SECURITY WARNING: Ignoring a Result can have real security implications."]
/// Decrypts `ciphertext`. Returns the decrypted data and the `StreamTag` indicating the type of message.
pub fn open_chunk(
&mut self,
ciphertext: &[u8],
) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, StreamTag), UnknownCryptoError> {
if ciphertext.len() < ABYTES {
return Err(UnknownCryptoError);
}
let mut opened_chunk = vec![0u8; ciphertext.len() - ABYTES];
let tag = self
.internal_sealer
.open_chunk(ciphertext, None, &mut opened_chunk)?;
Ok((opened_chunk, tag))
}
}
}
// Testing public functions in the module.
#[cfg(test)]
mod public {
use super::*;
mod test_seal_open {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_auth_enc_encryption_decryption() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let dst_ciphertext = seal(&key, plaintext).unwrap();
assert_eq!(dst_ciphertext.len(), plaintext.len() + (24 + 16));
let dst_plaintext = open(&key, &dst_ciphertext).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext, &dst_plaintext[..]);
}
#[test]
fn test_auth_enc_plaintext_empty_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let plaintext = "".as_bytes();
assert!(seal(&key, plaintext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_auth_enc_ciphertext_less_than_41_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let ciphertext = [0u8; XCHACHA_NONCESIZE + POLY1305_OUTSIZE];
assert!(open(&key, &ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_modified_nonce_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let mut dst_ciphertext = seal(&key, plaintext).unwrap();
// Modify nonce
dst_ciphertext[10] ^= 1;
assert!(open(&key, &dst_ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_modified_ciphertext_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let mut dst_ciphertext = seal(&key, plaintext).unwrap();
// Modify ciphertext
dst_ciphertext[25] ^= 1;
assert!(open(&key, &dst_ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_modified_tag_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let mut dst_ciphertext = seal(&key, plaintext).unwrap();
let dst_ciphertext_len = dst_ciphertext.len();
// Modify tag
dst_ciphertext[dst_ciphertext_len - 6] ^= 1;
assert!(open(&key, &dst_ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_diff_secret_key_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let dst_ciphertext = seal(&key, plaintext).unwrap();
let bad_key = SecretKey::default();
assert!(open(&bad_key, &dst_ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_secret_length_err() {
let key = SecretKey::generate(31).unwrap();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
assert!(seal(&key, plaintext).is_err());
assert!(open(&key, plaintext).is_err());
}
}
mod test_stream_seal_open {
use super::streaming::*;
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_auth_enc_encryption_decryption() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let dst_ciphertext = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
assert_eq!(dst_ciphertext.len(), plaintext.len() + 17);
let (dst_plaintext, tag) = opener.open_chunk(&dst_ciphertext).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext, &dst_plaintext[..]);
assert_eq!(tag, StreamTag::Message);
}
#[test]
fn test_seal_chunk_plaintext_empty_ok() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, _) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let plaintext = "".as_bytes();
assert!(sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_open_chunk_less_than_abytes_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let ciphertext = [0u8; ABYTES - 1];
let (_, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
assert!(opener.open_chunk(&ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_open_chunk_abytes_exact_ok() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
let ciphertext = sealer
.seal_chunk("".as_bytes(), &StreamTag::Message)
.unwrap();
let (pt, tag) = opener.open_chunk(&ciphertext).unwrap();
assert!(pt.is_empty());
assert_eq!(tag.as_byte(), 0u8);
}
#[test]
fn test_modified_tag_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let mut dst_ciphertext = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
// Modify tag
dst_ciphertext[0] ^= 1;
assert!(opener.open_chunk(&dst_ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_modified_ciphertext_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let mut dst_ciphertext = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
// Modify ciphertext
dst_ciphertext[1] ^= 1;
assert!(opener.open_chunk(&dst_ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_modified_mac_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let mut dst_ciphertext = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
// Modify mac
let macpos = dst_ciphertext.len() - 1;
dst_ciphertext[macpos] ^= 1;
assert!(opener.open_chunk(&dst_ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_diff_secret_key_err() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let plaintext = "Secret message".as_bytes();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let bad_key = SecretKey::default();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&bad_key, &nonce).unwrap();
let dst_ciphertext = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
assert!(opener.open_chunk(&dst_ciphertext).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn test_secret_length_err() {
let key = SecretKey::generate(31).unwrap();
assert!(StreamSealer::new(&key).is_err());
assert!(StreamOpener::new(&key, &Nonce::generate()).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn same_input_generates_different_ciphertext() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let plaintext = "Secret message 1".as_bytes();
let cipher1 = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
let cipher2 = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
assert_ne!(cipher1, cipher2);
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
let (dec1, tag1) = opener.open_chunk(&cipher1).unwrap();
let (dec2, tag2) = opener.open_chunk(&cipher2).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext, &dec1[..]);
assert_eq!(plaintext, &dec2[..]);
assert_eq!(tag1, StreamTag::Message);
assert_eq!(tag2, StreamTag::Message);
}
#[test]
fn same_input_on_same_init_different_ct() {
// Two sealers initialized that encrypt the same plaintext
// should produce different ciphertexts because the nonce
// is randomly generated.
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer_first, _) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let (mut sealer_second, _) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let plaintext = "Secret message 1".as_bytes();
let cipher1 = sealer_first
.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message)
.unwrap();
let cipher2 = sealer_second
.seal_chunk(plaintext, &StreamTag::Message)
.unwrap();
assert_ne!(cipher1, cipher2);
}
#[test]
fn test_stream_seal_and_open() {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let plaintext1 = "Secret message 1".as_bytes();
let plaintext2 = "Secret message 2".as_bytes();
let plaintext3 = "Secret message 3".as_bytes();
let cipher1 = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext1, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
let cipher2 = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext2, &StreamTag::Finish).unwrap();
let cipher3 = sealer.seal_chunk(plaintext3, &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
let (dec1, tag1) = opener.open_chunk(&cipher1).unwrap();
let (dec2, tag2) = opener.open_chunk(&cipher2).unwrap();
let (dec3, tag3) = opener.open_chunk(&cipher3).unwrap();
assert_eq!(plaintext1, &dec1[..]);
assert_eq!(plaintext2, &dec2[..]);
assert_eq!(plaintext3, &dec3[..]);
assert_eq!(tag1, StreamTag::Message);
assert_eq!(tag2, StreamTag::Finish);
assert_eq!(tag3, StreamTag::Message);
}
#[quickcheck]
#[cfg(feature = "safe_api")]
fn prop_stream_seal_open_same_input(input: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
let key = SecretKey::default();
let (mut sealer, nonce) = StreamSealer::new(&key).unwrap();
let ct = sealer.seal_chunk(&input[..], &StreamTag::Message).unwrap();
let mut opener = StreamOpener::new(&key, &nonce).unwrap();
let (pt_decrypted, tag) = opener.open_chunk(&ct).unwrap();
input == pt_decrypted && tag == StreamTag::Message
}
#[quickcheck]
#[cfg(feature = "safe_api")]
// Sealing input, and then opening should always yield the same input.
fn prop_seal_open_same_input(input: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
let pt = if input.is_empty() {
vec![1u8; 10]
} else {
input
};
let sk = SecretKey::default();
let ct = seal(&sk, &pt).unwrap();
let pt_decrypted = open(&sk, &ct).unwrap();
pt == pt_decrypted
}
#[quickcheck]
#[cfg(feature = "safe_api")]
// Sealing input, modifying the tag and then opening should
// always fail due to authentication.
fn prop_fail_on_diff_key(input: Vec<u8>) -> bool {
let pt = if input.is_empty() {
vec![1u8; 10]
} else {
input
};
let sk = SecretKey::default();
let sk2 = SecretKey::default();
let ct = seal(&sk, &pt).unwrap();
open(&sk2, &ct).is_err()
}
}
}