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use rand_core::{CryptoRng, RngCore}; use std::cmp; use std::error::Error; use std::fmt; use std::{collections::HashMap, hash::Hash}; // TODO: avoid heap allocations in encrypt/decrypt interfaces // TODO: make stuff like MAX_SKIP and MKS_CAPACITY dynamic // TODO: HeaderEncrypted version // Upper limit on the receive chain ratchet steps when trying to decrypt. Prevents a // denial-of-service attack where the attacker const MAX_SKIP: usize = 1000; /// Message Counter (as seen in the header) pub type Counter = u32; /// The `DoubleRatchet` can encrypt/decrypt messages while providing forward and future secrecy. /// /// The `DoubleRatchet` struct provides an implementation of the Double Ratchet Algorithm as /// defined in its [specification], including the unspecified symmetric initialization. After /// initialization (with `new_alice` or `new_bob`) the user can interact with the `DoubleRatchet` /// using the `ratchet_encrypt` and `ratchet_decrypt` methods, which automatically takes care of /// deriving the correct keys and updating the internal state. /// /// # Initialization /// /// When Alice and Bob want to use the `DoubleRatchet`, they need to initialize it using different /// constructors. The "Alice" or "Bob" role follows from the design of the authenticated key /// exchange that is used to initialize the secure communications channel. Two "modes" are /// possible, depending on whether just one or both of the parties must be able to send the first /// data message. See `new_alice` and `new_bob` for further details. /// /// # Provided security /// /// Conditional on the correct implementation of the `CryptoProvider`, the `DoubleRatchet` provides /// confidentiality of the plaintext and authentication of both the ciphertext and associated data. /// It does not provid anonimity, as the headers have to be sent in plain text and are sufficient /// for identifying the communicating parties. See `CryptoProvider` for further details on the /// required security properties. /// /// Forward secrecy (sometimes called the key-erasure property) preserves confidentiality of old /// messages in case of a device compromise. The `DoubleRatchet` provides forward secrecy by /// deriving a fresh key for every message: the sender deletes it immediately after encrypting and /// the receiver deletes it immediately after succesful decryption. Messages may arrive out of /// order, in which case the receiver is able to derive and store the keys for the skipped messages /// without compromising the forward secrecy of other messages. See [secure deletion] for further /// discussion. /// /// Future secrecy (sometimes called the self-healing property) restores confidentiality of new /// messages in case of a past device compromise. The `DoubleRatchet` provides future secrecy by /// generating a fresh `KeyPair` for every reply that is being sent. See [recovery from compromise] /// for further discussion. /// /// # Examples /// /// If Alice is guaranteed to send the first message to Bob, she can initialize her `DoubleRatchet` /// as shown here, without providing the symmetric `initial_receive` key. It is assumed that /// `shared_secret` and `bobs_public_key` are the result of some secure key exchange. A higher /// level protocol may force Alice to always send an empty initial message in order to fully /// initialize both parties. /// /// ``` /// # use double_ratchet::{mock, KeyPair, DoubleRatchet, EncryptUninit}; /// # type MyCryptoProvider = mock::CryptoProvider; /// # let mut csprng = mock::Rng::default(); /// # let bobs_keypair = mock::KeyPair::new(&mut csprng); /// # let bobs_public_key = bobs_keypair.public().clone(); /// # let shared_secret = [42, 0]; /// type DR = DoubleRatchet<MyCryptoProvider>; /// /// Alice and Bob have agreed on `shared_secret` and `bobs_public_key` /// let mut alice = DR::new_alice(&shared_secret, bobs_public_key, None, &mut csprng); /// let mut bob = DR::new_bob(shared_secret, bobs_keypair, None); /// /// /// Bob cannot send to Alice /// assert_eq!(Err(EncryptUninit), bob.try_ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Alice", b"B2A", &mut csprng)); /// /// /// Alice can send to Bob /// let (head, ct) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hello Bob", b"A2B", &mut csprng); /// let pt = bob.ratchet_decrypt(&head, &ct, b"A2B").unwrap(); /// assert_eq!(&pt[..], b"Hello Bob"); /// /// /// Now Bob can send to Alice /// let (head, ct) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Alice", b"B2A", &mut csprng); /// let pt = alice.ratchet_decrypt(&head, &ct, b"B2A").unwrap(); /// assert_eq!(&pt[..], b"Hi Alice"); /// ``` /// /// If it is required that either party can send the first message, the key exchange must provide /// us with an `extra_shared_secret`. /// /// ``` /// # use double_ratchet::{mock, KeyPair, DoubleRatchet}; /// # type MyCryptoProvider = mock::CryptoProvider; /// # let mut csprng = mock::Rng::default(); /// # let bobs_keypair = mock::KeyPair::new(&mut csprng); /// # let bobs_public_key = bobs_keypair.public().clone(); /// # let shared_secret = [42, 0]; /// # let extra_shared_secret = [42, 0, 0]; /// # type DR = DoubleRatchet<MyCryptoProvider>; /// let mut alice = DR::new_alice(&shared_secret, bobs_public_key, Some(extra_shared_secret), &mut csprng); /// let mut bob = DR::new_bob(shared_secret, bobs_keypair, Some(extra_shared_secret)); /// /// /// Either Alice or Bob can send the first message /// let (head_bob, ct_bob) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Alice", b"from Bob to Alice", &mut csprng); /// let (head_alice, ct_alice) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hello Bob", b"from Alice to Bob", &mut csprng); /// let pt_bob = alice.ratchet_decrypt(&head_bob, &ct_bob, b"from Bob to Alice").unwrap(); /// let pt_alice = bob.ratchet_decrypt(&head_alice, &ct_alice, b"from Alice to Bob").unwrap(); /// assert_eq!(&pt_alice[..], b"Hello Bob"); /// assert_eq!(&pt_bob[..], b"Hi Alice"); /// ``` /// /// [specification]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#double-ratchet-1 /// [secure deletion]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#secure-deletion /// [recovery from compromise]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#recovery-from-compromise pub struct DoubleRatchet<CP: CryptoProvider> { dhs: CP::KeyPair, dhr: Option<CP::PublicKey>, rk: CP::RootKey, cks: Option<CP::ChainKey>, ckr: Option<CP::ChainKey>, ns: Counter, nr: Counter, pn: Counter, mkskipped: KeyStore<CP>, } impl<CP> fmt::Debug for DoubleRatchet<CP> where CP: CryptoProvider, CP::KeyPair: fmt::Debug, CP::PublicKey: fmt::Debug, CP::RootKey: fmt::Debug, CP::ChainKey: fmt::Debug, CP::MessageKey: fmt::Debug, { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { write!( f, "DoubleRatchet {{ dhs: {:?}, dhr: {:?}, rk: {:?}, cks: {:?}, ckr: {:?}, ns: {:?}, \ nr: {:?}, pn: {:?}, mkskipped: {:?} }}", self.dhs, self.dhr, self.rk, self.cks, self.ckr, self.ns, self.nr, self.pn, self.mkskipped ) } } impl<CP: CryptoProvider> DoubleRatchet<CP> where { /// Initialize "Alice": the sender of the first message. /// /// This implements `RatchetInitAlice` as defined in the [specification] when `initial_receive /// = None`: after initialization Alice must send a message to Bob before he is able to provide /// a reply. /// /// Alternatively Alice provides an extra symmetric key: `initial_receive = Some(key)`, so that /// both Alice and Bob can send the first message. Note however that even when Alice and Bob /// initialize this way the initialization is asymmetric in the sense that Alice requires Bob's /// public key. /// /// Either Alice and Bob must supply the same extra symmetric key or both must supply none. /// /// # Security considerations /// /// For security, initialization through `new_alice` has the following requirements: /// - `shared_secret` must be both *confidential* and *authenticated* /// - `them` must be *authenticated* /// - `initial_receive` is `None` or `Some(key)` where `key` is *confidential* and *authenticated* /// /// [specification]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#initialization pub fn new_alice<R: CryptoRng + RngCore>( shared_secret: &CP::RootKey, them: CP::PublicKey, initial_receive: Option<CP::ChainKey>, rng: &mut R, ) -> Self { let dhs = CP::KeyPair::new(rng); let (rk, cks) = CP::kdf_rk(shared_secret, &CP::diffie_hellman(&dhs, &them)); Self { dhs, dhr: Some(them), rk, cks: Some(cks), ckr: initial_receive, ns: 0, nr: 0, pn: 0, mkskipped: KeyStore::new(), } } /// Initialize "Bob": the receiver of the first message. /// /// This implements `RatchetInitBob` as defined in the [specification] when `initial_send = /// None`: after intialization Bob must receive a message from Alice before he can send his /// first message. /// /// Alternatively Bob provides an extra symmetric key: `initial_send = Some(key)`, so that both /// Alice and Bob can send the first message. Note however that even when Alice and Bob /// initialize this way the initialization is asymmetric in the sense that Bob must provide his /// public key to Alice. /// /// Either Alice and Bob must supply the same extra symmetric key or both must supply none. /// /// # Security considerations /// /// For security, initialization through `new_bob` has the following requirements: /// - `shared_secret` must be both *confidential* and *authenticated* /// - the private key of `us` must remain secret on Bob's device /// - `initial_send` is `None` or `Some(key)` where `key` is *confidential* and *authenticated* /// /// [specification]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#initialization pub fn new_bob( shared_secret: CP::RootKey, us: CP::KeyPair, initial_send: Option<CP::ChainKey>, ) -> Self { Self { dhs: us, dhr: None, rk: shared_secret, cks: initial_send, ckr: None, ns: 0, nr: 0, pn: 0, mkskipped: KeyStore::new(), } } /// Try to encrypt the plaintext. See `ratchet_encrypt` for details. /// /// Fails with `EncryptUninit` when `self` is not yet initialized for encrypting. pub fn try_ratchet_encrypt<R: CryptoRng + RngCore>( &mut self, plaintext: &[u8], associated_data: &[u8], rng: &mut R, ) -> Result<(Header<CP::PublicKey>, Vec<u8>), EncryptUninit> { if self.can_encrypt() { Ok(self.ratchet_encrypt(plaintext, associated_data, rng)) } else { Err(EncryptUninit) } } /// Encrypt the plaintext, ratchet forward and return the (header, ciphertext) pair. /// /// Implements `RatchetEncrypt` as defined in the [specification]. The header should be sent /// along the ciphertext in order for the recipient to be able to `ratchet_decrypt`. The /// ciphertext is encrypted in some /// [AEAD](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption) mode, which encrypts the /// `plaintext` and authenticates the `plaintext`, `associated_data` and the header. /// /// The internal state of the DoubleRatchet is automatically updated so that the next /// message key be sent with a fresh key. /// /// Note that `rng` is only used for updating the internal state and not for encrypting the /// data. /// /// # Panics /// /// Panics if the DoubleRatchet is not initialized for sending yet. If this is a concern, use /// `try_ratchet_encrypt` instead to avoid panics. /// /// [specification]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#encrypting-messages pub fn ratchet_encrypt<R: CryptoRng + RngCore>( &mut self, plaintext: &[u8], associated_data: &[u8], rng: &mut R, ) -> (Header<CP::PublicKey>, Vec<u8>) { // TODO: is this the correct place for clear_stack_on_return? let (h, mk) = self.ratchet_send_chain(rng); let pt = CP::encrypt(&mk, plaintext, &Self::concat(&h, associated_data)); (h, pt) } // Are we initialized such that we can encrypt messages? fn can_encrypt(&self) -> bool { self.cks.is_some() || self.dhr.is_some() } // Ratcheting forward the DH chain for sending is delayed until the first message in that chain // is going to be sent. // // [specification]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#deferring-new-ratchet-key-generation // // # Panics // // Panics if encrypting is not yet intialized fn ratchet_send_chain<R: CryptoRng + RngCore>( &mut self, rng: &mut R, ) -> (Header<CP::PublicKey>, CP::MessageKey) { if self.cks.is_none() { let dhr = self .dhr .as_ref() .expect("not yet initialized for encryption"); self.dhs = CP::KeyPair::new(rng); let (rk, cks) = CP::kdf_rk(&self.rk, &CP::diffie_hellman(&self.dhs, dhr)); self.rk = rk; self.cks = Some(cks); self.pn = self.ns; self.ns = 0; } let h = Header { dh: self.dhs.public().clone(), n: self.ns, pn: self.pn, }; let (cks, mk) = CP::kdf_ck(self.cks.as_ref().unwrap()); self.cks = Some(cks); self.ns += 1; (h, mk) } /// Verify-decrypt the ciphertext, update the state and return the plaintext. /// /// Implements `RatchetDecrypt` as defined in the [specification]. Decryption of the ciphertext /// includes verifying the authenticity of the `header`, `ciphertext` and `associated_data` /// (optional). /// /// The internal state of the DoubleRatchet is automatically updated upon successful /// decryption. This includes storing the `MessageKeys` of any skipped messages so these /// messages can be decrypted if they arrive out of order. /// /// Returns a `DecryptError` when the plaintext could not be decrypted: the internal state /// remains unchanged in that case. There could be many reasons: inspect the returned /// error-value for further details. /// /// [specification]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#decrypting-messages-1 pub fn ratchet_decrypt( &mut self, header: &Header<CP::PublicKey>, ciphertext: &[u8], associated_data: &[u8], ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, DecryptError> { // TODO: is this the correct place for clear_stack_on_return? let (diff, pt) = self.try_decrypt(header, ciphertext, &Self::concat(&header, associated_data))?; self.update(diff, header); Ok(pt) } // The actual decryption. Gets a (non-mutable) reference to self to ensure that the state is // not changed. Upon succesful decryption the state must be updated. The minimum amount of work // is done in order to retrieve the correct `MessageKey`: the returned `Diff` object contains // the result of that work to avoid doing the work again. fn try_decrypt( &self, h: &Header<CP::PublicKey>, ct: &[u8], ad: &[u8], ) -> Result<(Diff<CP>, Vec<u8>), DecryptError> { use Diff::*; if let Some(mk) = self.mkskipped.get(&h.dh, h.n) { Ok((OldKey, CP::decrypt(mk, ct, ad)?)) } else if self.dhr.as_ref() == Some(&h.dh) { let (ckr, mut mks) = Self::skip_message_keys(self.ckr.as_ref().unwrap(), self.get_current_skip(h)?); let mk = mks.pop().unwrap(); Ok((CurrentChain(ckr, mks), CP::decrypt(&mk, ct, ad)?)) } else { let (rk, ckr) = CP::kdf_rk(&self.rk, &CP::diffie_hellman(&self.dhs, &h.dh)); let (ckr, mut mks) = Self::skip_message_keys(&ckr, self.get_next_skip(h)?); let mk = mks.pop().unwrap(); Ok((NextChain(rk, ckr, mks), CP::decrypt(&mk, ct, ad)?)) } } // Calculate how many messages should be skipped in the current receive chain to get the // required `MessageKey`. Also check if `h` is valid. fn get_current_skip(&self, h: &Header<CP::PublicKey>) -> Result<usize, DecryptError> { let skip = h.n.checked_sub(self.nr) .ok_or(DecryptError::MessageKeyNotFound)? as usize; if MAX_SKIP < skip { Err(DecryptError::SkipTooLarge) } else if self.mkskipped.can_store(skip) { Ok(skip) } else { Err(DecryptError::StorageFull) } } // Calculate how many messages should be skipped in the next receive chain to get the required // `MessageKey`. Also check if `h` is valid. fn get_next_skip(&self, h: &Header<CP::PublicKey>) -> Result<usize, DecryptError> { // without malicious participants this error can only be triggered if the local MessageKey // has already been deleted. let prev_skip = h.pn.checked_sub(self.nr) .ok_or(DecryptError::MessageKeyNotFound)? as usize; let skip = h.n as usize; if MAX_SKIP < cmp::max(prev_skip, skip) { Err(DecryptError::SkipTooLarge) } else if self .mkskipped .can_store((prev_skip + skip).saturating_sub(1)) { Ok(skip) } else { Err(DecryptError::StorageFull) } } // Update the internal state. Assumes that the validity of `h` has already been checked. fn update(&mut self, diff: Diff<CP>, h: &Header<CP::PublicKey>) { use Diff::*; match diff { OldKey => self.mkskipped.remove(&h.dh, h.n), CurrentChain(ckr, mks) => { self.mkskipped.extend(&h.dh, self.nr, mks); self.ckr = Some(ckr); self.nr = h.n + 1; } NextChain(rk, ckr, mks) => { if self.ckr.is_some() && self.nr < h.pn { let ckr = self.ckr.as_ref().unwrap(); let (_, prev_mks) = Self::skip_message_keys(ckr, (h.pn - self.nr - 1) as usize); let dhr = self.dhr.as_ref().unwrap(); self.mkskipped.extend(dhr, self.nr, prev_mks); } self.dhr = Some(h.dh.clone()); self.rk = rk; self.cks = None; self.ckr = Some(ckr); self.nr = h.n + 1; self.mkskipped.extend(&h.dh, 0, mks); } } } // Do `skip + 1` ratchet steps in the receive chain. Return the last ChainKey // and all computed MessageKeys. fn skip_message_keys(ckr: &CP::ChainKey, skip: usize) -> (CP::ChainKey, Vec<CP::MessageKey>) { // Note: should use std::iter::unfold (currently still in nightly) let mut mks = Vec::with_capacity(skip + 1); let (mut ckr, mk) = CP::kdf_ck(&ckr); mks.push(mk); for _ in 0..skip { let cm = CP::kdf_ck(&ckr); ckr = cm.0; mks.push(cm.1); } (ckr, mks) } // Concatenate `h` and `ad` in a single byte-vector. fn concat(h: &Header<CP::PublicKey>, ad: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> { let mut v = Vec::new(); v.extend_from_slice(ad); h.extend_bytes_into(&mut v); v } } /// The Header that should be sent alongside the ciphertext. /// /// The Header contains the information for the `DoubleRatchet` to find the correct `MessageKey` to /// decrypt the message. It is generated by encrypting a message. #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct Header<PublicKey> { /// The public half of the key-pair of the sender pub dh: PublicKey, /// Counts the number of messages that have been sent in the current send ratchet pub n: Counter, /// Counts the number of messages that have been sent in the previous send ratchet pub pn: Counter, } impl<PK: AsRef<[u8]>> Header<PK> { // yikes fn extend_bytes_into(&self, v: &mut Vec<u8>) { v.extend_from_slice(self.dh.as_ref()); v.extend_from_slice(&self.n.to_be_bytes()); v.extend_from_slice(&self.pn.to_be_bytes()); } } /// Provider of the required cryptographic types and functions. /// /// The implementer of this trait provides the `DoubleRatchet` with the required external functions /// as given in the [specification]. /// /// # Security considerations /// /// The details of the `CryptoProvider` are critical for providing security of the communication. /// The `DoubleRatchet` can only guarantee security of communication when instantiated with a /// `CryptoProvider` with secure types and functions. The [specification] provides some sensible /// [recommendations] and for example code using the `DoubleRatchet` see `tests/signal.rs`. /// /// [specification]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#external-functions /// [recommendations]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#recommended-cryptographic-algorithms pub trait CryptoProvider { /// A public key for use in the Diffie-Hellman calculation. /// /// It is assumed that a `PublicKey` holds a valid key, so if any verification is required the /// constructor of this type would be a good place to do so. type PublicKey: AsRef<[u8]> + Clone + Eq + Hash; /// A private/public key-pair for use in the Diffie-Hellman calculation. type KeyPair: KeyPair<PublicKey = Self::PublicKey>; /// The result of a Diffie-Hellman calculation. type SharedSecret; /// A `RootKey` is used in the outer Diffie-Hellman ratchet. type RootKey; /// A `ChainKey` is used in the inner symmetric ratchets. type ChainKey; /// A `MessageKey` is used to encrypt/decrypt messages. /// /// The implementation of this type could be a complex type: for example an implementation that /// works by the encrypt-then-MAC paradigm may require a tuple consisting of an encryption key /// and a MAC key. type MessageKey; /// Perform the Diffie-Hellman operation. fn diffie_hellman(us: &Self::KeyPair, them: &Self::PublicKey) -> Self::SharedSecret; /// Derive a new root-key/chain-key pair from the old root-key and a fresh shared secret. fn kdf_rk( root_key: &Self::RootKey, shared_secret: &Self::SharedSecret, ) -> (Self::RootKey, Self::ChainKey); /// Derive a new chain-key/message-key pair from the old chain-key. fn kdf_ck(chain_key: &Self::ChainKey) -> (Self::ChainKey, Self::MessageKey); /// Authenticate-encrypt the plaintext and associated data. /// /// This method MUST authenticate the associated data, as it contains the header bytes fn encrypt(key: &Self::MessageKey, plaintext: &[u8], associated_data: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8>; /// Verify-decrypt the ciphertext and associated data. fn decrypt( key: &Self::MessageKey, ciphertext: &[u8], associated_data: &[u8], ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, DecryptError>; } /// A private-/public-key pair /// /// This trait is required for `CryptoProvider::KeyPair` pub trait KeyPair { /// Type of the public half of the key pair /// /// This type should be equal to `CryptoProvider::PublicKey` type PublicKey; /// Generate a new random `KeyPair` fn new<R: CryptoRng + RngCore>(rng: &mut R) -> Self; /// Get a reference to the public half of the key pair fn public(&self) -> &Self::PublicKey; } // Maximum amount of skipped message keys that can be stored const MKS_CAPACITY: usize = 2000; // A KeyStore holds the skipped `MessageKey`s. // // When messages can arrive out of order, the DoubleRatchet must store the MessageKeys // corresponding to the messages that were skipped over. See also the [specification] for further // discussion. // // [specification]: https://signal.org/docs/specifications/doubleratchet/#deletion-of-skipped-message-keys struct KeyStore<CP: CryptoProvider>(HashMap<CP::PublicKey, HashMap<Counter, CP::MessageKey>>); impl<CP> fmt::Debug for KeyStore<CP> where CP: CryptoProvider, CP::PublicKey: fmt::Debug, CP::MessageKey: fmt::Debug, { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { write!(f, "KeyStore({:?})", self.0) } } impl<CP: CryptoProvider> KeyStore<CP> { fn new() -> Self { Self(HashMap::new()) } // Get the MessageKey at `(dh, n)` if it is stored fn get(&self, dh: &CP::PublicKey, n: Counter) -> Option<&CP::MessageKey> { self.0.get(dh)?.get(&n) } // Do `n` more MessageKeys fit in the KeyStore? fn can_store(&self, n: usize) -> bool { let current: usize = self.0.values().map(|v| v.len()).sum(); current + n <= MKS_CAPACITY } // Extend the storage with `mks` // // Keys are stored at `dh` and `n` counting upwards: // (dh, n ): mks[0] // (dh, n+1): mks[1] // ... fn extend(&mut self, dh: &CP::PublicKey, n: Counter, mks: Vec<CP::MessageKey>) { let values = (n..).zip(mks.into_iter()); if let Some(v) = self.0.get_mut(dh) { v.extend(values); } else { self.0.insert(dh.clone(), values.collect()); } } // Remove the MessageKey at index `(dh, n)` // // Assumes the MessageKey is indeed stored. fn remove(&mut self, dh: &CP::PublicKey, n: Counter) { debug_assert!(self.0.contains_key(dh)); let hm = self.0.get_mut(dh).unwrap(); debug_assert!(hm.contains_key(&n)); if hm.len() == 1 { self.0.remove(dh); } else { hm.remove(&n); } } } // Required information for updating the state after succesful decryption enum Diff<CP: CryptoProvider> { // Key was found amongst old key OldKey, // Key was part of the current receive chain CurrentChain(CP::ChainKey, Vec<CP::MessageKey>), // Key was part of the next receive chain NextChain(CP::RootKey, CP::ChainKey, Vec<CP::MessageKey>), } /// Error that occurs on `try_ratchet_encrypt` before the state is initialized. #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct EncryptUninit; impl Error for EncryptUninit {} impl fmt::Display for EncryptUninit { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { write!( f, "Encrypt not yet initialized (you must receive a message first)" ) } } /// Error that may occur during `ratchet_decrypt` #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum DecryptError { /// Could not verify-decrypt the ciphertext + associated data + header DecryptFailure, /// Could not find the message key required for decryption /// /// Note that this implementation is not always able to detect when a `MessageKey` can't be /// found: a `DecryptFailure` may be triggered instead. MessageKeyNotFound, /// Header message counter is too large SkipTooLarge, /// Storage of skipped message keys is full StorageFull, } impl Error for DecryptError {} impl fmt::Display for DecryptError { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { use DecryptError::*; match self { DecryptFailure => write!(f, "Error during verify-decrypting"), MessageKeyNotFound => { write!(f, "Could not find the message key required for decryption") } SkipTooLarge => write!(f, "Header message counter is too large"), StorageFull => write!(f, "Storage for skipped messages is full"), } } } // Create a mock CryptoProvider for testing purposes. See `tests/signal.rs` for a proper example // implementation. #[cfg(feature = "test")] #[allow(unused)] #[allow(missing_docs)] pub mod mock { pub type DoubleRatchet = super::DoubleRatchet<CryptoProvider>; pub struct CryptoProvider; impl super::CryptoProvider for CryptoProvider { type KeyPair = KeyPair; type PublicKey = PublicKey; type SharedSecret = u8; type RootKey = [u8; 2]; type ChainKey = [u8; 3]; type MessageKey = [u8; 3]; fn diffie_hellman(us: &KeyPair, them: &PublicKey) -> u8 { us.0[0].wrapping_add(them.0[0]) } fn kdf_rk(rk: &[u8; 2], s: &u8) -> ([u8; 2], [u8; 3]) { ([rk[0], *s], [rk[0], rk[1], 0]) } fn kdf_ck(ck: &[u8; 3]) -> ([u8; 3], [u8; 3]) { ([ck[0], ck[1], ck[2].wrapping_add(1)], *ck) } fn encrypt(mk: &[u8; 3], pt: &[u8], ad: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> { let mut ct = Vec::from(&mk[..]); ct.extend_from_slice(pt); ct.extend_from_slice(ad); ct } fn decrypt(mk: &[u8; 3], ct: &[u8], ad: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, super::DecryptError> { if ct.len() < 3 + ad.len() || ct[..3] != mk[..] || !ct.ends_with(ad) { Err(super::DecryptError::DecryptFailure) } else { Ok(Vec::from(&ct[3..ct.len() - ad.len()])) } } } #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)] pub struct PublicKey([u8; 1]); impl AsRef<[u8]> for PublicKey { fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] { &self.0 } } #[derive(Debug)] pub struct KeyPair([u8; 1], PublicKey); impl super::KeyPair for KeyPair { type PublicKey = PublicKey; #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)] fn new<R: rand_core::CryptoRng + rand_core::RngCore>(rng: &mut R) -> Self { let n = rng.next_u32() as u8; Self([n], PublicKey([n + 1])) } fn public(&self) -> &PublicKey { &self.1 } } // FIXME: this functionality exists already, but breaks the build... // use rand::rngs::mock::StepRng; #[derive(Default)] pub struct Rng(u64); impl rand_core::RngCore for Rng { fn next_u64(&mut self) -> u64 { self.0 += 1; self.0 } #[allow(clippy::cast_possible_truncation)] fn next_u32(&mut self) -> u32 { self.next_u64() as u32 } fn fill_bytes(&mut self, out: &mut [u8]) { rand_core::impls::fill_bytes_via_next(self, out); } fn try_fill_bytes(&mut self, out: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), rand_core::Error> { self.fill_bytes(out); Ok(()) } } impl super::CryptoRng for Rng {} } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; type DR = DoubleRatchet<mock::CryptoProvider>; fn asymmetric_setup(rng: &mut mock::Rng) -> (DR, DR) { let secret = [42, 0]; let pair = mock::KeyPair::new(rng); let pubkey = pair.public().clone(); let alice = DR::new_alice(&secret, pubkey, None, rng); let bob = DR::new_bob(secret, pair, None); (alice, bob) } fn symmetric_setup(rng: &mut mock::Rng) -> (DR, DR) { let secret = [42, 0]; let ck_init = [42, 0, 0]; let pair = mock::KeyPair::new(rng); let pubkey = pair.public().clone(); let alice = DR::new_alice(&secret, pubkey, Some(ck_init), rng); let bob = DR::new_bob(secret, pair, Some(ck_init)); (alice, bob) } #[test] fn test_asymmetric_setup() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); // Alice can encrypt, Bob can't let (pt_a, ad_a) = (b"Hi Bobby", b"A2B"); let (pt_b, ad_b) = (b"What's up Al?", b"B2A"); let (h_a, ct_a) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(pt_a, ad_a, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Err(EncryptUninit), bob.try_ratchet_encrypt(pt_b, ad_b, &mut rng) ); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_a[..])), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a, &ct_a, ad_a) ); // but after decryption Bob can encrypt let (h_b, ct_b) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(pt_b, ad_b, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_b[..])), alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b, &ct_b, ad_b) ); } #[test] fn test_symmetric_setup() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = symmetric_setup(&mut rng); // Alice can encrypt, Bob can't let (pt_a, ad_a) = (b"Hi Bobby", b"A2B"); let (pt_b, ad_b) = (b"What's up Al?", b"B2A"); let (h_a, ct_a) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(pt_a, ad_a, &mut rng); let (h_b, ct_b) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(pt_b, ad_b, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_a[..])), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a, &ct_a, ad_a) ); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_b[..])), alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b, &ct_b, ad_b) ); } #[test] fn symmetric_out_of_order() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); let (ad_a, ad_b) = (b"A2B", b"B2A"); // Alice's message arrive out of order, some are even missing let pt_a_0 = b"Hi Bobby"; let (h_a_0, ct_a_0) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(pt_a_0, ad_a, &mut rng); for _ in 1..9 { alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"hello?", ad_a, &mut rng); // drop these messages } let pt_a_9 = b"are you there?"; let (h_a_9, ct_a_9) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(pt_a_9, ad_a, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_a_9[..])), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_9, &ct_a_9, ad_a) ); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_a_0[..])), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0, ad_a) ); // Bob's replies also arrive out of order let pt_b_0 = b"Yes I'm here"; let (h_b_0, ct_b_0) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(pt_b_0, ad_b, &mut rng); for _ in 1..9 { bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"why?", ad_b, &mut rng); // drop these messages } let pt_b_9 = b"Tell me why!!!"; let (h_b_9, ct_b_9) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(pt_b_9, ad_b, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_b_9[..])), alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_9, &ct_b_9, ad_b) ); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_b_0[..])), alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_0, &ct_b_0, ad_b) ); } #[test] fn dh_out_of_order() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); let (ad_a, ad_b) = (b"A2B", b"B2A"); let pt_a_0 = b"Good day Robert"; let (h_a_0, ct_a_0) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(pt_a_0, ad_a, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_a_0[..])), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0, ad_a) ); let pt_a_1 = b"Do you like Rust?"; let (h_a_1, ct_a_1) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(pt_a_1, ad_a, &mut rng); // Bob misses pt_a_1 let pt_b_0 = b"Salutations Allison"; let (h_b_0, ct_b_0) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(pt_b_0, ad_b, &mut rng); // Alice misses pt_b_0 let pt_b_1 = b"How is your day going?"; let (h_b_1, ct_b_1) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(pt_b_1, ad_b, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_b_1[..])), alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_1, &ct_b_1, ad_b) ); let pt_a_2 = b"My day is fine."; let (h_a_2, ct_a_2) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(pt_a_2, ad_a, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_a_2[..])), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_2, &ct_a_2, ad_a) ); // now Bob receives pt_a_1 assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_a_1[..])), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_1, &ct_a_1, ad_a) ); let pt_b_2 = b"Yes I like Rust"; let (h_b_2, ct_b_2) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(pt_b_2, ad_b, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_b_2[..])), alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_2, &ct_b_2, ad_b) ); // now Alice receives pt_b_0 assert_eq!( Ok(Vec::from(&pt_b_0[..])), alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_0, &ct_b_0, ad_b) ); } #[test] #[should_panic(expected = "not yet initialized for encryption")] fn encrypt_error() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (_alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); assert_eq!( Err(EncryptUninit), bob.try_ratchet_encrypt(b"", b"", &mut rng) ); bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"", b"", &mut rng); } #[test] fn decrypt_failure() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); let (ad_a, ad_b) = (b"A2B", b"B2A"); // Next chain let (h_a_0, ct_a_0) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Bob", ad_a, &mut rng); let mut ct_a_0_err = ct_a_0.clone(); ct_a_0_err[2] ^= 0x80; let mut h_a_0_err = h_a_0.clone(); h_a_0_err.pn = 1; assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0_err, ad_a) ); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0_err, &ct_a_0, ad_a) ); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0, ad_b) ); // Current Chain let (h_a_1, ct_a_1) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Bob", ad_a, &mut rng); bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_1, &ct_a_1, ad_a).unwrap(); let (h_a_2, ct_a_2) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Bob", ad_a, &mut rng); let mut h_a_2_err = h_a_2.clone(); h_a_2_err.pn += 1; let mut ct_a_2_err = ct_a_2.clone(); ct_a_2_err[0] ^= 0x04; assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_2, &ct_a_2_err, ad_a) ); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_2_err, &ct_a_2, ad_a) ); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_2, &ct_a_2, ad_b) ); // Previous chain let (h_b, ct_b) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Alice", ad_b, &mut rng); alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b, &ct_b, ad_b).unwrap(); let (h_a_3, ct_a_3) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Bob", ad_a, &mut rng); bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_3, &ct_a_3, ad_a).unwrap(); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_2, &ct_a_2_err, ad_a) ); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_2_err, &ct_a_2, ad_a) ); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::DecryptFailure), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_2, &ct_a_2, ad_b) ); } #[test] fn double_sending() { // The implementation is unable to consistently detect why decryption fails when receiving // double messages: the only requirement should be that *any* error is triggered. let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); let (ad_a, ad_b) = (b"A2B", b"B2A"); let (h_a_0, ct_a_0) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Whatever", ad_a, &mut rng); bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0, ad_a).unwrap(); assert!(bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0, ad_a).is_err()); let (h_b_0, ct_b_0) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"Whatever", ad_b, &mut rng); alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_0, &ct_b_0, ad_b).unwrap(); assert!(alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_0, &ct_b_0, ad_b).is_err()); let (h_a_1, ct_a_1) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Whatever", ad_a, &mut rng); bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_1, &ct_a_1, ad_a).unwrap(); assert!(bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_1, &ct_a_1, ad_a).is_err()); let (h_b_1, ct_b_1) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"Whatever", ad_b, &mut rng); alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_1, &ct_b_1, ad_b).unwrap(); assert!(alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_1, &ct_b_1, ad_b).is_err()); assert!(bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0, ad_a).is_err()); assert!(alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_0, &ct_b_0, ad_b).is_err()); } #[test] fn invalid_header() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); let (ad_a, ad_b) = (b"A2B", b"B2A"); let (h_a_0, ct_a_0) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Bob", ad_a, &mut rng); bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0, ad_a).unwrap(); let (h_b_0, ct_b_0) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Alice", ad_b, &mut rng); alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b_0, &ct_b_0, ad_b).unwrap(); let (mut h_a_1, ct_a_1) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"I will lie to you now", ad_a, &mut rng); assert_eq!(h_a_1.pn, 1); h_a_1.pn = 0; assert!(bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_1, &ct_a_1, ad_a).is_err()); } #[test] fn skip_too_large() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); let (ad_a, ad_b) = (b"A2B", b"B2A"); let (h_a_0, ct_a_0) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Bob", ad_a, &mut rng); for _ in 0..=MAX_SKIP { alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Not sending this", ad_a, &mut rng); } let (h_a_1, ct_a_1) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"n > MAXSKIP", ad_a, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::SkipTooLarge), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_1, &ct_a_1, ad_a) ); bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_0, &ct_a_0, ad_a).unwrap(); let (h_b, ct_b) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hi Alice", ad_b, &mut rng); alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b, &ct_b, ad_b).unwrap(); let (h_a_2, ct_a_2) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"pn > MAXSKIP", ad_a, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::SkipTooLarge), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a_2, &ct_a_2, ad_a) ); } #[test] fn storage_full() { let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); let ad_a = b"A2B"; let mut stored = 0; while stored < MKS_CAPACITY { for _ in 0..cmp::min(MAX_SKIP, MKS_CAPACITY - stored) { alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Not sending this", ad_a, &mut rng); } let (h_a, ct_a) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Hello Bob", ad_a, &mut rng); bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a, &ct_a, ad_a).unwrap(); stored += MAX_SKIP; dbg!(&bob.mkskipped.0.values().map(|hm| hm.len()).sum::<usize>()); } alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Bob can't store this key anymore", ad_a, &mut rng); let (h_a, ct_a) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"Gotcha, Bob!", ad_a, &mut rng); assert_eq!( Err(DecryptError::StorageFull), bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a, &ct_a, ad_a) ); } #[test] fn cannot_crash_other() { // Malicious parties should not be able to crash the other end (this was an // issue in an old implementation). let mut rng = mock::Rng::default(); let (ad_a, ad_b) = (b"A2B", b"B2A"); let (mut alice, mut bob) = symmetric_setup(&mut rng); alice.pn = 10; bob.pn = 10; let (h_a, ct_a) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"not important", ad_a, &mut rng); let (h_b, ct_b) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"not important", ad_b, &mut rng); let _ = alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b, &ct_b, ad_b); let _ = bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a, &ct_a, ad_a); let (mut alice, mut bob) = asymmetric_setup(&mut rng); alice.pn = 10; let (h_a, ct_a) = alice.ratchet_encrypt(b"not important", ad_a, &mut rng); let _ = bob.ratchet_decrypt(&h_a, &ct_a, ad_a); bob.pn = 10; let (h_b, ct_b) = bob.ratchet_encrypt(b"not important", ad_b, &mut rng); let _ = alice.ratchet_decrypt(&h_b, &ct_b, ad_b); } }