[−][src]Crate shs_core
Most of the comments are taken from Duncan's fantastic Scuttlebutt Protocol Guide (repo), which he graciously released into the public domain.
Modules
| client | |
| server |
Structs
| ClientAuth | Message 3 |
| ClientEphPublicKey | |
| ClientEphSecretKey | |
| ClientHello | Message 1 |
| ClientPublicKey | |
| ClientSecretKey | |
| ClientSignature | |
| ClientToServerKey | At this point the handshake has succeeded. The client and server have proven their identities to each other. |
| ClientToServerNonce | |
| ClientToServerNonceGen | |
| NetworkId | |
| ServerAccept | Message 4 |
| ServerEphPublicKey | |
| ServerEphSecretKey | |
| ServerHello | Message 2 |
| ServerPublicKey | |
| ServerSecretKey | |
| ServerSignature | |
| ServerToClientKey | |
| ServerToClientNonce | |
| ServerToClientNonceGen | |
| SharedA | Now that ephemeral keys have been exchanged, both ends use them to derive a shared secret using scalar multiplication. |
| SharedB | Because the client already knows the server’s long term public key, both ends derive a second secret that will allow the client to send a message that only the real server can read and not a man-in-the-middle. |
| SharedC | Now that the server knows the client’s long term public key, another shared secret is derived by both ends. The server uses this shared secret to send a message that only the real client can read and not a man-in-the-middle. |