//! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
//! here.
//!
//! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
//! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
//! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
//!
//! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
//! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
//! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
//! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
//! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.

use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
use bitcoin::util::bip143;

use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;

use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use secp256k1;

use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
use util::{byte_utils, events};

use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
use std::{hash,cmp, mem};

/// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
	/// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
	/// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
	///
	/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
	/// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
	/// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
	/// the channel to an operational state.
	///
	/// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
	/// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
	/// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
	///
	/// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
	/// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
	/// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
	/// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
	/// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
	/// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
	/// been "frozen".
	///
	/// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
	/// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
	/// channel operation.
	///
	/// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
	/// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
	/// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
	TemporaryFailure,
	/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
	/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
	/// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
	///
	/// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
	PermanentFailure,
}

/// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
/// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
/// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
/// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
/// Contains a human-readable error message.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);

/// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
/// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
pub struct HTLCUpdate {
	pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
	pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
	pub(super) source: HTLCSource
}

/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
/// server(s).
///
/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
///
/// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
/// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
/// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
/// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
/// all registered listeners in one go.
pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
	/// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
	///
	/// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
	/// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
	/// any spends of it.
	fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;

	/// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
	/// with success or failure backward
	fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
}

/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
///
/// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
///
/// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
///
/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
	#[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
	pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
	#[cfg(not(test))]
	monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
	chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
	broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
	pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
	pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
	logger: Arc<Logger>,
	fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
}

impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {

	fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
		let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
		let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
		let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
		{
			let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
			for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
				let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
				if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
					new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
						outputs: spendable_outputs,
					});
				}

				for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
					for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
						self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
					}
				}
				htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
			}
		}
		{
			// ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
			let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
			for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
				match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
						// In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
						// we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
						// (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
						let mut existing_claim = false;
						e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
							if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
								if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
									existing_claim = true;
									true
								} else { false }
							} else { true }
						});
						if !existing_claim {
							e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
						}
					}
					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
						e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
					}
				}
			}
		}
		let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
		pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
	}

	fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
		let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
		for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
			monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
		}
	}
}

impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
	/// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
	/// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
	pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
		let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
			monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
			chain_monitor,
			broadcaster,
			pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
			pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
			logger,
			fee_estimator: feeest,
		});

		res
	}

	/// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
	pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
		let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
		match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
			Some(orig_monitor) => {
				log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
				return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
			},
			None => {}
		};
		match monitor.key_storage {
			Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
				match funding_info {
					&None => {
						return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
					},
					&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
						log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
						self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
						self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
					},
				}
			},
			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
				self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
			}
		}
		monitors.insert(key, monitor);
		Ok(())
	}
}

impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
	fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
		match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
			Ok(_) => Ok(()),
			Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
		}
	}

	fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
		let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
		let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
		for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
			for htlc_data in v {
				pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
					payment_hash: k,
					payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
					source: htlc_data.0,
				});
			}
		}
		pending_htlcs_updated
	}
}

impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
	fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
		let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
		let mut ret = Vec::new();
		mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
		ret
	}
}

/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
/// HTLC-Success transaction.
/// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
/// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
/// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
/// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
/// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
/// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
/// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
/// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
/// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
/// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
/// accurate block height.
/// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
/// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
/// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
/// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
/// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
/// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
/// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
/// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;

#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum Storage {
	Local {
		revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
		htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
		delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
		payment_base_key: SecretKey,
		shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
		prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
		latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
		funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
		current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
		prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
	},
	Watchtower {
		revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
		htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
	}
}

#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
struct LocalSignedTx {
	/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
	txid: Sha256dHash,
	tx: Transaction,
	revocation_key: PublicKey,
	a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
	b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
	delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
	feerate_per_kw: u64,
	htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
}

#[derive(PartialEq)]
enum InputDescriptors {
	RevokedOfferedHTLC,
	RevokedReceivedHTLC,
	OfferedHTLC,
	ReceivedHTLC,
	RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
}

/// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
/// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
/// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum InputMaterial {
	Revoked {
		script: Script,
		pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
		key: SecretKey,
		is_htlc: bool,
		amount: u64,
	},
	RemoteHTLC {
		script: Script,
		key: SecretKey,
		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
		amount: u64,
		locktime: u32,
	},
	LocalHTLC {
		script: Script,
		sigs: (Signature, Signature),
		preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
		amount: u64,
	}
}

impl Writeable for InputMaterial  {
	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
		match self {
			&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
				writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
				script.write(writer)?;
				pubkey.write(writer)?;
				writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
				if *is_htlc {
					writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
				} else {
					writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
				}
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
			},
			&InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
				writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
				script.write(writer)?;
				key.write(writer)?;
				preimage.write(writer)?;
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
			},
			&InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
				writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
				script.write(writer)?;
				sigs.0.write(writer)?;
				sigs.1.write(writer)?;
				preimage.write(writer)?;
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
			}
		}
		Ok(())
	}
}

impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
	fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
		let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
			0 => {
				let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
					0 => true,
					1 => false,
					_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
				};
				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
				InputMaterial::Revoked {
					script,
					pubkey,
					key,
					is_htlc,
					amount
				}
			},
			1 => {
				let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
				InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
					script,
					key,
					preimage,
					amount,
					locktime
				}
			},
			2 => {
				let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
				InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
					script,
					sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
					preimage,
					amount
				}
			}
			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
		};
		Ok(input_material)
	}
}

/// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
/// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
enum OnchainEvent {
	/// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
	/// bump-txn candidate buffer.
	Claim {
		claim_request: Sha256dHash,
	},
	/// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
	/// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
	/// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
	HTLCUpdate {
		htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
	},
	/// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
	/// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
	/// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
	ContentiousOutpoint {
		outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
		input_material: InputMaterial,
	}
}

/// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
	// At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
	// much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
	height_timer: u32,
	// Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
	feerate_previous: u64,
	// Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
	// a priority of not feerate
	soonest_timelock: u32,
	// Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
	per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
}

impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial  {
	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
		for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
			outp.write(writer)?;
			tx_material.write(writer)?;
		}
		Ok(())
	}
}

impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
	fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
		let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
		for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
			let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
			per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
		}
		Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
	}
}

const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;

/// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
/// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
///
/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct ChannelMonitor {
	commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,

	key_storage: Storage,
	their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
	their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
	// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
	their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,

	our_to_self_delay: u16,
	their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,

	old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
	remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
	/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
	/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
	/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
	/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
	/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
	remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
	/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
	/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
	/// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
	/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
	remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,

	// We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
	// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
	// various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
	// transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
	prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
	current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,

	// Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
	// deserialization
	current_remote_commitment_number: u64,

	payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,

	destination_script: Script,
	// Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
	// back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
	// scan every commitment transaction for that
	to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,

	// Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
	// it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
	// another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
	// same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
	// block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
	// equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
	// after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
	// we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
	// Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
	// us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
	// Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
	#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
	pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
	#[cfg(not(test))]
	pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,

	// Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
	// Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
	// Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
	// is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
	// post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
	// block with output gets disconnected.
	#[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
	pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
	#[cfg(not(test))]
	claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,

	// Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
	// we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
	// actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
	onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,

	// We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
	// consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
	// (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
	// their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
	// the full block_connected).
	pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
	secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
	logger: Arc<Logger>,
}

macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
	($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
		{
			$used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
			let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
			if $value <= fee {
				$used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
				fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
				if $value <= fee {
					$used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
					fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
					if $value <= fee {
						log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
							fee, $value);
						false
					} else {
						log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
							$value);
						$value -= fee;
						true
					}
				} else {
					log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
						$value);
					$value -= fee;
					true
				}
			} else {
				$value -= fee;
				true
			}
		}
	}
}

#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
/// underlying object
impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
	fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
		if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
			self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
			self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
			self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
			self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
			self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
			self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
			self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
			self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
			self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
			self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
			self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
			self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
			self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
			self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
			self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
			self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
			self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
			self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
		{
			false
		} else {
			for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
				if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
					return false
				}
			}
			true
		}
	}
}

impl ChannelMonitor {
	pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
		ChannelMonitor {
			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,

			key_storage: Storage::Local {
				revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
				htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
				delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
				payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
				shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
				prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
				latest_per_commitment_point: None,
				funding_info: None,
				current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
				prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
			},
			their_htlc_base_key: None,
			their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
			their_cur_revocation_points: None,

			our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
			their_to_self_delay: None,

			old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
			remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
			remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
			remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),

			prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
			current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
			current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,

			payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
			destination_script: destination_script,
			to_remote_rescue: None,

			pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),

			claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),

			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),

			last_block_hash: Default::default(),
			secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
			logger,
		}
	}

	fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
		let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
		for inp in inputs {
			// We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
			tx_weight +=  match inp {
				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
				&InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
				},
				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
				&InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
				},
				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig  + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
				&InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
				},
				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
				&InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
				},
				// number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
				&InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
					1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
				},
			};
		}
		tx_weight
	}

	fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
		if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
			return current_height + 1
		} else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
			return current_height + 3
		}
		current_height + 15
	}

	#[inline]
	fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
		for i in 0..48 {
			if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
				return i
			}
		}
		48
	}

	#[inline]
	fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
		let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
		for i in 0..bits {
			let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
			if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
				res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
				res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
			}
		}
		res
	}

	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
	/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
	/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
	pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
		let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
		for i in 0..pos {
			let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
			if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
				return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
			}
		}
		if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
			return Ok(());
		}
		self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);

		// Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
		// events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
		// TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
		if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
			if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
				for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
					*source = None;
				}
			}
		}

		if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
			let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
			let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
			let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
			let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;

			self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
				for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
					if k == htlc.payment_hash {
						return true
					}
				}
				if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
					for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
						if k == htlc.payment_hash {
							return true
						}
					}
				}
				let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
					if *cn < min_idx {
						return true
					}
					true
				} else { false };
				if contains {
					remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
				}
				false
			});
		}

		Ok(())
	}

	/// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
	/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
	/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
	/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
	pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
		// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
		// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
		// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
		// timeouts)
		for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
			self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
		}

		let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
		log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
		log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
		if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
			*prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
			*current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
		}
		self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
		self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
		//TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
			Some(old_points) => {
				if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
				} else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
					if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
					} else {
						self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
					}
				} else {
					self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
				}
			},
			None => {
				self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
			}
		}
	}

	pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
		match self.key_storage {
			Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
				if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
					let to_remote_script =  Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
						.push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
						.into_script();
					if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
						self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
					}
				}
			},
			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
		}
	}

	/// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
	/// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
	/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
	/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
	/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
	/// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
	/// case of onchain HTLC tx
	pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
		assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
		self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
		self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
			txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
			tx: signed_commitment_tx,
			revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
			a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
			b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
			delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
			feerate_per_kw,
			htlc_outputs,
		});

		if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
			*latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
		} else {
			panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
		}
	}

	/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
	/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
	pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
		self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
	}

	/// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
	/// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
	/// chain for new blocks/transactions.
	pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
		match self.key_storage {
			Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
				if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
				let our_funding_info = funding_info;
				if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
					if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
					// We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
					// easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
					if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
						return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
					}
				} else {
					return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
				}
			},
			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
				if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
					unimplemented!();
				} else {
					return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
				}
			},
		}
		let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
		let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
		if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
			self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
		}
		if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
				let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
				let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
				if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
					self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
				}
			}
		}
		// TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
		// local transactions to decide how to merge
		if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
			self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
			for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
				self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
			}
			if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
				self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
			}
			if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
				self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
			}
			self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
			self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
		}

		self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
		Ok(())
	}

	/// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
	pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
		assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
		self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
	}

	/// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
	/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
	/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
	/// provides slightly better privacy.
	/// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
	/// value as key to add_update_monitor.
	pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
		match self.key_storage {
			Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
				*funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
			},
			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
				panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
			}
		}
	}

	/// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
	pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
		self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
		self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
	}

	pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
		self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
	}

	pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
		match self.key_storage {
			Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
				*funding_info = None;
			},
			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
				panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
			},
		}
	}

	/// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
	pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
		match self.key_storage {
			Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
				match funding_info {
					&Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
					&None => None
				}
			},
			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
				return None;
			}
		}
	}

	/// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
	/// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
	/// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
	/// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
	pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
		let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
		for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
			for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
				res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
			}
		}
		res
	}

	/// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
	fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
		//TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
		//serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
		writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
		writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;

		// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
		U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;

		macro_rules! write_option {
			($thing: expr) => {
				match $thing {
					&Some(ref t) => {
						1u8.write(writer)?;
						t.write(writer)?;
					},
					&None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
				}
			}
		}

		match self.key_storage {
			Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
				writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
				writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
				writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
				writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
				writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
				writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
				prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
				latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
				match funding_info  {
					&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
						writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
						writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
						script.write(writer)?;
					},
					&None => {
						debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
					},
				}
				current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
				prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
			},
			Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
		}

		writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
		writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;

		match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
			Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
				writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
				match second_option {
					Some(second_pubkey) => {
						writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
					},
					None => {
						writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
					},
				}
			},
			None => {
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
			},
		}

		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;

		for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
			writer.write_all(secret)?;
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
		}

		macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
			($htlc_output: expr) => {
				writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
				writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
				$htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
			}
		}

		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
		for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
			for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
				serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
				write_option!(htlc_source);
			}
		}

		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
		for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
			writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
			(txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
			for script in txouts.iter() {
				script.write(writer)?;
			}
		}

		if for_local_storage {
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
			for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
				writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
			}
		} else {
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
		}

		macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
			($local_tx: expr) => {
				if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
					match e {
						encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
						_ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
					}
				}

				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
				writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;

				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
				writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
				for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
					serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
					if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
						1u8.write(writer)?;
						writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
						writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
					} else {
						0u8.write(writer)?;
					}
					write_option!(htlc_source);
				}
			}
		}

		if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
			serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
		} else {
			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
		}

		if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
			serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
		} else {
			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
		}

		if for_local_storage {
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
		} else {
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
		}

		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
		for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
			writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
		}

		self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
		self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
		if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
			writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
			to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
			local_key.write(writer)?;
		} else {
			writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
		}

		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
		for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
			ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
			claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
		}

		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
		for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
			outp.write(writer)?;
			claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
			claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
		}

		writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
		for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
			writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
			for ev in events.iter() {
				match *ev {
					OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
						writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
						claim_request.write(writer)?;
					},
					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
						writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
						htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
						htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
					},
					OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
						writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
						outpoint.write(writer)?;
						input_material.write(writer)?;
					}
				}
			}
		}

		Ok(())
	}

	/// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
	///
	/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
	/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
	/// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
	/// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
	/// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
	pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
		self.write(writer, true)
	}

	/// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
	///
	/// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
	/// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
	/// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
	/// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
	/// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
	pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
		self.write(writer, false)
	}

	/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
	pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
		for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
			if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
				return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
			}
		}
		assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
		None
	}

	pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
		//TODO This can be optimized?
		let mut min = 1 << 48;
		for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
			if idx < min {
				min = idx;
			}
		}
		min
	}

	pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
		self.current_remote_commitment_number
	}

	pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
		} else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
	}

	/// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
	/// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
	/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
	/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
	/// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
	/// revoked remote commitment tx
	fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
		// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
		// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
		let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
		let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();

		let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
		let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);

		macro_rules! ignore_error {
			( $thing : expr ) => {
				match $thing {
					Ok(a) => a,
					Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
				}
			};
		}

		let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
		if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
			let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
			let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
			let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
				Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
					let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
					(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
					ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
					Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
				},
				Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
					let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
					(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
					ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
					None)
				},
			};
			let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
			let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
				None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
				Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
			};

			let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
			let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();

			let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
				// Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
				// script_pubkey version.
				let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
				Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
			} else { None };

			let mut total_value = 0;
			let mut inputs = Vec::new();
			let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
			let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();

			for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
				if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
					inputs.push(TxIn {
						previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
							txid: commitment_txid,
							vout: idx as u32,
						},
						script_sig: Script::new(),
						sequence: 0xfffffffd,
						witness: Vec::new(),
					});
					inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
					inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
					total_value += outp.value;
				} else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
					spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
						outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
						key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
						output: outp.clone(),
					});
				}
			}

			macro_rules! sign_input {
				($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
					{
						let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
							Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
								let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
									let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
									chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
								};
								let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
								let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
								(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
							},
							Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
								unimplemented!();
							}
						};
						$input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
						$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
						if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
							$input.witness.push(vec!(1));
						} else {
							$input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
						}
						$input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
						(redeemscript, revocation_key)
					}
				}
			}

			if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
				inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());

				for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
					if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
						let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
						if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
								tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
								tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
							return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
						}
						let input = TxIn {
							previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
								txid: commitment_txid,
								vout: transaction_output_index,
							},
							script_sig: Script::new(),
							sequence: 0xfffffffd,
							witness: Vec::new(),
						};
						if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
							inputs.push(input);
							inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
							inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
							total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
						} else {
							let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
								version: 2,
								lock_time: 0,
								input: vec![input],
								output: vec!(TxOut {
									script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
									value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
								}),
							};
							let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
							let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
							let mut used_feerate;
							if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
								let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
								let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
								assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
								log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
								let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
								per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
								match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
									hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
									hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
								}
								match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
									hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
									hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
								}
								txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
							}
						}
					}
				}
			}

			if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
				// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
				log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
				watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
				self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));

				macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
					($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
						if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
							for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
								if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
									log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
									match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
										hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
											let e = entry.get_mut();
											e.retain(|ref event| {
												match **event {
													OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
														return htlc_update.0 != **source
													},
													_ => return true
												}
											});
											e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
										}
										hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
											entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
										}
									}
								}
							}
						}
					}
				}
				if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
					if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
						check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
					}
					if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
						check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
					}
				}
				// No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
			}
			if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx

			let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
				script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
				value: total_value,
			});
			let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
				version: 2,
				lock_time: 0,
				input: inputs,
				output: outputs,
			};

			let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);

			let mut used_feerate;
			if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
				return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
			}

			let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);

			let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
			let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
			for info in inputs_info.iter() {
				if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
					soonest_timelock = info.2;
				}
			}
			let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
			let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
			for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
				let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
				log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
				per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
				match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
				}
			}
			match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
				hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
			}

			assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());

			spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
				outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
				output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
			});
			txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
		} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
			// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
			// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
			// confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
			// upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
			// already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
			// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
			// insert it here.
			watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
			self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));

			log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);

			macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
				($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
					if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
						$id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
							if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
								// Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
								// broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
								// fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
								// payment_preimage.
								// Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
								// commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
								// broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
								// cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
								// need to here.
								for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
									if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
										continue $id;
									}
								}
								log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
								match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
									hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
										let e = entry.get_mut();
										e.retain(|ref event| {
											match **event {
												OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
													return htlc_update.0 != **source
												},
												_ => return true
											}
										});
										e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
									}
									hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
										entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
									}
								}
							}
						}
					}
				}
			}
			if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
				if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
					check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
				}
				if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
					check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
				}
			}

			if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
				let revocation_point_option =
					if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
					else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
						if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
					} else { None };
				if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
					let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
						Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
							(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
							ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
						},
						Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
							(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
							ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
						},
					};
					let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
						None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
						Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
					};

					for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
						if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
							match self.key_storage {
								Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
									if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
										spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
											outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
											key: local_key,
											output: outp.clone(),
										});
									}
								},
								Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
							}
							break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
						}
					}

					let mut total_value = 0;
					let mut inputs = Vec::new();
					let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
					let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();

					macro_rules! sign_input {
						($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
							{
								let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
									Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
										let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
										let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
										let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
										let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
										(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
									},
									Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
										unimplemented!();
									}
								};
								$input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
								$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
								$input.witness.push($preimage);
								$input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
								(redeemscript, htlc_key)
							}
						}
					}

					for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
						if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
							let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
							if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
									tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
									tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
								return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
							}
							if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
								if htlc.offered {
									let input = TxIn {
										previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
											txid: commitment_txid,
											vout: transaction_output_index,
										},
										script_sig: Script::new(),
										sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
										witness: Vec::new(),
									};
									if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
										inputs.push(input);
										inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
										inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
										total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
									} else {
										let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
											version: 2,
											lock_time: 0,
											input: vec![input],
											output: vec!(TxOut {
												script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
												value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
											}),
										};
										let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
										let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
										let mut used_feerate;
										if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
											let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
											let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
											assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
											spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
												outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
												output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
											});
											log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
											let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
											per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
											match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
												hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
												hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
											}
											match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
												hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
												hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
											}
											txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
										}
									}
								}
							}
							if !htlc.offered {
								// TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
								// rest of the claim transaction, as above.
								let input = TxIn {
									previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
										txid: commitment_txid,
										vout: transaction_output_index,
									},
									script_sig: Script::new(),
									sequence: idx as u32,
									witness: Vec::new(),
								};
								let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
									version: 2,
									lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
									input: vec![input],
									output: vec!(TxOut {
										script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
										value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
									}),
								};
								let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
								let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
								let mut used_feerate;
								if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
									let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
									let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
									assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
									//TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
									log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
									let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
									per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
									match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
										hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
										hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
									}
									match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
										hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
										hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
									}
								}
								txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
							}
						}
					}

					if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx

					let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
						script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
						value: total_value
					});
					let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
						version: 2,
						lock_time: 0,
						input: inputs,
						output: outputs,
					};

					let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);

					let mut used_feerate;
					if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
						return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
					}

					let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);

					let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
					let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
					for info in inputs_info.iter() {
						if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
							soonest_timelock = info.2;
						}
					}
					let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
					let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
					for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
						let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
						log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
						per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
						match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
							hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
							hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
						}
					}
					match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
						hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
						hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
					}
					assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
					spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
						outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
						output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
					});
					txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
				}
			}
		} else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
			for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
				if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
					spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
						outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
						key: local_key.clone(),
						output: outp.clone(),
					});
				}
			}
		}

		(txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
	}

	/// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
	fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
		//TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
		if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
			return (None, None)
		}

		macro_rules! ignore_error {
			( $thing : expr ) => {
				match $thing {
					Ok(a) => a,
					Err(_) => return (None, None)
				}
			};
		}

		let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
		let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
		let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
		let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
			Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
				ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
			},
			Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
				ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
			},
		};
		let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
			None => return (None, None),
			Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
		};
		let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
		let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
		let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!

		let mut inputs = Vec::new();
		let mut amount = 0;

		if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
			inputs.push(TxIn {
				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
					txid: htlc_txid,
					vout: 0,
				},
				script_sig: Script::new(),
				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
				witness: Vec::new(),
			});
			amount = tx.output[0].value;
		}

		if !inputs.is_empty() {
			let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
				script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
				value: amount
			});

			let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
				version: 2,
				lock_time: 0,
				input: inputs,
				output: outputs,
			};
			let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
			let mut used_feerate;
			if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
				return (None, None);
			}

			let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);

			let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
				Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
					let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
					let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
					(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
				}
				Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
					unimplemented!();
				}
			};
			spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
			spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
			spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
			spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());

			assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
			let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
			let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
			let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
			log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
			let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
			per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
			match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
				hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
			}
			match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
				hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
				hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
			}
			(Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
		} else { (None, None) }
	}

	fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
		let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
		let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
		let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());

		macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
			($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
				if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
					if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
						if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
							spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
								outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
								key: local_delayedkey,
								witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
								to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
								output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
							});
						}
					}
				}
			}
		}

		let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
		let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
		for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
			if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
				add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
				break;
			}
		}

		for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
			if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
				if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
					if htlc.offered {
						log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
						let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);

						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy

						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);

						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
						let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
						htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());

						add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
						let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
						let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
						per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
						//TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
						log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
						pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
						res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
					} else {
						if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
							log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
							let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);

							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy

							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);

							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
							let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
							htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());

							add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
							let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
							let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
							per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
							//TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
							log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
							pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
							res.push(htlc_success_tx);
						}
					}
					watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
				} else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
			}
		}

		(res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
	}

	/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
	/// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
	/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
	fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
		let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
		let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
		let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();

		macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
			($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
				log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
				match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
						let e = entry.get_mut();
						e.retain(|ref event| {
							match **event {
								OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
									return htlc_update.0 != $source
								},
								_ => return true
							}
						});
						e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
					}
					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
						entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
					}
				}
			}
		}

		macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
			($updates: expr) => {
				local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
				spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
				watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
				for claim in $updates.3 {
					match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
						hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
						hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
					}
				}
			}
		}

		// HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
		let mut is_local_tx = false;

		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
				is_local_tx = true;
				log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
				match self.key_storage {
					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
					},
					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
					}
				}
			}
		}
		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
				is_local_tx = true;
				log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
				match self.key_storage {
					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
					},
					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
						append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
					}
				}
			}
		}

		macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
			($local_tx: expr) => {
				for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
					if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
						if let &Some(ref source) = source {
							wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
						}
					}
				}
			}
		}

		if is_local_tx {
			if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
				fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
			}
			if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
				fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
			}
		}

		(local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
	}

	/// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
	fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
		if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
			match self.key_storage {
				Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } =>  {
					let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
					let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
					for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
						if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
							return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
								outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
								output: output.clone(),
							});
						}
					}
				}
				Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
					//TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
					// comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
				}
			}
		}
		None
	}

	/// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
	/// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
	/// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
	/// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
	/// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
	/// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
	/// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
	/// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
	/// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
	pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
		if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
			match self.key_storage {
				Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
					res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
					// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
					// The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
				},
				_ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
			};
			res
		} else {
			Vec::new()
		}
	}

	fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
		log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
		let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
		let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
		let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
		let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
		for tx in txn_matched {
			if tx.input.len() == 1 {
				// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
				// commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
				// which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
				// filters.
				let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
				let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
				let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
					Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
						funding_info.clone()
					}
					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
						unimplemented!();
					}
				};
				if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
					if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
						let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
						txn = remote_txn;
						spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
						if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
							watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
						}
						if txn.is_empty() {
							let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
							spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
							txn = local_txn;
							if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
								watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
							}
						}
					}
					if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
						if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
							spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
						}
					}
				} else {
					if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
						let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
						if let Some(tx) = tx {
							txn.push(tx);
						}
						if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
							spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
						}
					}
				}
				for tx in txn.iter() {
					log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
					broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
				}
			}
			// While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
			// can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
			// we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
			let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
			if updated.len() > 0 {
				htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
			}

			// Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
			let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
			for inp in &tx.input {
				if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
					// If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
					if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
						//... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
						// outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
						// by us.
						let mut set_equality = true;
						if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
							set_equality = false;
						} else {
							for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
								if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
									set_equality = false;
								}
							}
						}

						macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
							() => {
								let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
								match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
									hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
										if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
											entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
										}
									},
									hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
										entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
									}
								}
							}
						}

						// If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
						// before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
						// ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
						if set_equality {
							clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
						} else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
							for input in tx.input.iter() {
								if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
									claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
								}
								// If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
								if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
									clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
								}
							}
							//TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
							bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
						}
						break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
					} else {
						panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
					}
				}
			}
			for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
				let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
				match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
					hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
						if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
							entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
						}
					},
					hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
						entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
					}
				}
			}
		}
		if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
				log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx));
				broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
				match self.key_storage {
					Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
						let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
						spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
						if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
							watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
						}
						for tx in txs {
							log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
							broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
						}
					},
					Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
						let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
						spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
						if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
							watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
						}
						for tx in txs {
							log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
							broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
						}
					}
				}
			}
		}
		if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
			for ev in events {
				match ev {
					OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
						// We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
						// been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
						if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
							for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
								self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
							}
						}
					},
					OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
						log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
						htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
					},
					OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
						self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
					}
				}
			}
		}
		for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
			if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
				bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
			}
		}
		for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
			if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
				if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
					if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
						broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
						Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
					} else { None }
				} else { unreachable!(); }
			} {
				if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
					claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
					claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
				} else { unreachable!(); }
			}
		}
		self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
		(watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
	}

	fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) {
		let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
		if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
			//We may discard:
			//- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
			//- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
			//- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
			for ev in events {
				match ev {
					OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
						if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
							if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
								claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
								// Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
								// resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
								bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
							}
						}
					},
					_ => {},
				}
			}
		}
		for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
			if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
				claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
				claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
				broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
			}
		}
		for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
			self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
		}
		//TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
		// right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
		let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
		self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
			if v.1 == height {
			remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
			false
			} else { true });
		for req in remove_request {
			self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
		}
		self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
	}

	pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
		// We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
		//  * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
		//    transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
		//  * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
		//    broadcast if we go on-chain.
		// Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
		// strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
		// to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
		// updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
		// easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
		macro_rules! scan_commitment {
			($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
				for ref htlc in $htlcs {
					// For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
					// chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
					// time out the HTLC first.
					// For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
					// concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
					// channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
					// counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
					// can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
					// chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
					// we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
					// on-chain for an expired HTLC.
					// Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
					// from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
					// corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
					// least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
					//  aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
					//      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
					//      outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
					//      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
					//      CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
					//      LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
					//  The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
					//  with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
					let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
					if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
					   (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
						log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
						return true;
					}
				}
			}
		}

		if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
			scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
		}

		if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
			if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
				if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
					scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
				}
			}
			if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
				if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
					scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
				}
			}
		}

		false
	}

	/// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
	/// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
	fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
		let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();

		'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
			let mut payment_data = None;
			let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
				|| (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
			let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
			let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;

			macro_rules! log_claim {
				($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
					// We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
					// as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
					// to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
					// This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
					let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
					if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
							(outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
						log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
					} else {
						log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
							$tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
							if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
							if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
					}
				}
			}

			macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
				($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
					if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
						for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
							if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
								if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
									log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
									payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
									break;
								}
							}
						}
					}
				}
			}

			macro_rules! scan_commitment {
				($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
					for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
						if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
							if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
								log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
								// We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
								// local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
								// transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
								// has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
								// resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
								payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
							} else if !$local_tx {
								if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
									check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
								}
								if payment_data.is_none() {
									if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
										check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
									}
								}
							}
							if payment_data.is_none() {
								log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
								continue 'outer_loop;
							}
						}
					}
				}
			}

			if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
				if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
					scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
						"our latest local commitment tx", true);
				}
			}
			if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
				if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
					scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
						"our previous local commitment tx", true);
				}
			}
			if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
				scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
					"remote commitment tx", false);
			}

			// Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
			// HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
			if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
				let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
				if accepted_preimage_claim {
					payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
					htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
				} else if offered_preimage_claim {
					payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
					htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
				} else {
					log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
					match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
						hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
							let e = entry.get_mut();
							e.retain(|ref event| {
								match **event {
									OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
										return htlc_update.0 != source
									},
									_ => return true
								}
							});
							e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
						}
						hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
							entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
						}
					}
				}
			}
		}
		htlc_updated
	}

	/// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
	/// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
	fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
		if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
		let mut inputs = Vec::new();
		for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
			inputs.push(TxIn {
				previous_output: *outp,
				script_sig: Script::new(),
				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
				witness: Vec::new(),
			});
		}
		let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
			version: 2,
			lock_time: 0,
			input: inputs,
			output: vec![TxOut {
				script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
				value: 0
			}],
		};

		macro_rules! RBF_bump {
			($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
				{
					let mut used_feerate;
					// If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
					let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
						let mut value = $amount;
						if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
							// Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
							$amount - value
						} else {
							log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
							return None;
						}
					// ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
					} else {
						let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
						if $amount <= fee {
							log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
							return None;
						}
						fee
					};

					let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
					let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
					// BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
					// 	* 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
					//	* 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
					let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
						new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
					} else {
						new_fee
					};
					Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
				}
			}
		}

		let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
		let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
		let mut amt = 0;
		for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
			match per_outp_material {
				&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
					inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { &[] });
					amt += *amount;
				},
				&InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
					inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
					amt += *amount;
				},
				&InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
			}
		}

		let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
		let new_feerate;
		if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
			// If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
			if new_fee > amt {
				bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
			} else {
				bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
			}
			new_feerate = feerate;
		} else {
			return None;
		}
		assert!(new_feerate != 0);

		for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
			match per_outp_material {
				&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
					let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
					let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
					let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
					bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
					bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
					if *is_htlc {
						bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
					} else {
						bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
					}
					bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
					log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if script.len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "offered" } else if script.len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
				},
				&InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
					if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
					let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
					let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
					let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
					bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
					bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
					if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
						bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
					} else {
						bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
					}
					bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
					log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
				},
				&InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
					//TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
					// RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
					// https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
					return None;
				}
			}
		}
		assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
		Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
	}
}

const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;

impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
	fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
		macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
			($key: expr) => {
				match $key {
					Ok(res) => res,
					Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
				}
			}
		}

		let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
			return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
		}

		let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;

		let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
			0 => {
				let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
				// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
				// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
				let outpoint = OutPoint {
					txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
					index: Readable::read(reader)?,
				};
				let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
				let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
				Storage::Local {
					revocation_base_key,
					htlc_base_key,
					delayed_payment_base_key,
					payment_base_key,
					shutdown_pubkey,
					prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
					latest_per_commitment_point,
					funding_info,
					current_remote_commitment_txid,
					prev_remote_commitment_txid,
				}
			},
			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
		};

		let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
		let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);

		let their_cur_revocation_points = {
			let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
			if first_idx == 0 {
				None
			} else {
				let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
				if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
					Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
				} else {
					Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
				}
			}
		};

		let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);

		let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
		for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
			*secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
			*idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
		}

		macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
			() => {
				{
					let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;

					HTLCOutputInCommitment {
						offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
					}
				}
			}
		}

		let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
		for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
			let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
			for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
				htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
			}
			if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
			}
		}

		let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
		for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
			let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
			let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
			let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
			for _ in 0..outputs_count {
				outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
			}
			if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
			}
		}

		let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
		for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
			let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
			if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
			}
		}

		macro_rules! read_local_tx {
			() => {
				{
					let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
						Ok(tx) => tx,
						Err(e) => match e {
							encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
							_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
						},
					};

					if tx.input.is_empty() {
						// Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
						return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
					}

					let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;

					let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
					let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
					for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
						let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
						let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
							0 => None,
							1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
							_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
						};
						htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
					}

					LocalSignedTx {
						txid: tx.txid(),
						tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
						htlc_outputs: htlcs
					}
				}
			}
		}

		let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
			0 => None,
			1 => {
				Some(read_local_tx!())
			},
			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
		};

		let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
			0 => None,
			1 => {
				Some(read_local_tx!())
			},
			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
		};

		let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;

		let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
		for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
			let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
			if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
				return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
			}
		}

		let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
			0 => None,
			1 => {
				let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
				let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
				Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
			}
			_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
		};

		let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
		for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
			pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
		}

		let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
		for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
			let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
			claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
		}

		let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
		let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
		for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
			let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
			let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
			for _ in 0..events_len {
				let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
					0 => {
						let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
						OnchainEvent::Claim {
							claim_request
						}
					},
					1 => {
						let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
						let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
						OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
							htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
						}
					},
					2 => {
						let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
						let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
						OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
							outpoint,
							input_material
						}
					}
					_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
				};
				events.push(ev);
			}
			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
		}

		Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
			commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,

			key_storage,
			their_htlc_base_key,
			their_delayed_payment_base_key,
			their_cur_revocation_points,

			our_to_self_delay,
			their_to_self_delay,

			old_secrets,
			remote_claimable_outpoints,
			remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
			remote_hash_commitment_number,

			prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
			current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
			current_remote_commitment_number,

			payment_preimages,

			destination_script,
			to_remote_rescue,

			pending_claim_requests,

			claimable_outpoints,

			onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,

			last_block_hash,
			secp_ctx,
			logger,
		}))
	}

}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
	use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
	use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
	use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
	use bitcoin::util::bip143;
	use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
	use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
	use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
	use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
	use hex;
	use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
	use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
	use ln::chan_utils;
	use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
	use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
	use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
	use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
	use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
	use std::sync::Arc;

	#[test]
	fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
		// Test vectors from BOLT 3:
		let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
		let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
		let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());

		macro_rules! test_secrets {
			() => {
				let mut idx = 281474976710655;
				for secret in secrets.iter() {
					assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
					idx -= 1;
				}
				assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
				assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
			};
		}

		{
			// insert_secret correct sequence
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();
		}

		{
			// insert_secret #1 incorrect
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
					"Previous secret did not match new one");
		}

		{
			// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
					"Previous secret did not match new one");
		}

		{
			// insert_secret #3 incorrect
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
					"Previous secret did not match new one");
		}

		{
			// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
					"Previous secret did not match new one");
		}

		{
			// insert_secret #5 incorrect
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
					"Previous secret did not match new one");
		}

		{
			// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
					"Previous secret did not match new one");
		}

		{
			// insert_secret #7 incorrect
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
					"Previous secret did not match new one");
		}

		{
			// insert_secret #8 incorrect
			monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
			secrets.clear();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
			monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
			test_secrets!();

			secrets.push([0; 32]);
			secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
			assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
					"Previous secret did not match new one");
		}
	}

	#[test]
	fn test_prune_preimages() {
		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
		let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());

		let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
		macro_rules! dummy_keys {
			() => {
				{
					TxCreationKeys {
						per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
						revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
						a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
						b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
						a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
						b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
					}
				}
			}
		}
		let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };

		let mut preimages = Vec::new();
		{
			let mut rng  = thread_rng();
			for _ in 0..20 {
				let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
				rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
				let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
				preimages.push((preimage, hash));
			}
		}

		macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
			($preimages_slice: expr) => {
				{
					let mut res = Vec::new();
					for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
						res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
							offered: true,
							amount_msat: 0,
							cltv_expiry: 0,
							payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
							transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
						}, None));
					}
					res
				}
			}
		}
		macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
			($preimages_slice: expr) => {
				{
					let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
					let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
					res
				}
			}
		}

		macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
			($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
				for preimage in $preimages_slice {
					assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
				}
			}
		}

		// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
		// old state.
		let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
		monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);

		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
		monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
		monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
		monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
		monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
		for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
			monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
		}

		// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
		let mut secret = [0; 32];
		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);

		// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);

		// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
		// previous commitment tx's preimages too
		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);

		// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
		monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
		secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
		monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
		assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
		test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
	}

	#[test]
	fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
		// We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
		// not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.

		let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
		let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
		let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
		let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;

		macro_rules! sign_input {
			($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
				let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
					offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
					amount_msat: 0,
					cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
					payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
					transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
				};
				let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
				let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
				let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
				$input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
				$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
				sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
				if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
					$input.witness.push(vec!(1));
				} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
					$input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
				} else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
					$input.witness.push(vec![0]);
				} else {
					$input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
				}
				$input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
				println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
				println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
				println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
			}
		}

		let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
		let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();

		// Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
		let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
		for i in 0..4 {
			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
					txid,
					vout: i,
				},
				script_sig: Script::new(),
				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
				witness: Vec::new(),
			});
		}
		claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
			script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
			value: 0,
		});
		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
		let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
		for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
			sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
		}
		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));

		// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
		claim_tx.input.clear();
		sum_actual_sigs = 0;
		for i in 0..4 {
			claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
				previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
					txid,
					vout: i,
				},
				script_sig: Script::new(),
				sequence: 0xfffffffd,
				witness: Vec::new(),
			});
		}
		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
		let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
		for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
			sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
		}
		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]),  claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));

		// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
		claim_tx.input.clear();
		sum_actual_sigs = 0;
		claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
			previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
				txid,
				vout: 0,
			},
			script_sig: Script::new(),
			sequence: 0xfffffffd,
			witness: Vec::new(),
		});
		let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
		let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
		let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
		for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
			sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
		}
		assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
	}

	// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
}