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//! From libsecp256k1:
//!
//! The Secp256k1 curve has an endomorphism, where lambda * (x, y) = (beta * x, y), where
//! lambda is {0x53,0x63,0xad,0x4c,0xc0,0x5c,0x30,0xe0,0xa5,0x26,0x1c,0x02,0x88,0x12,0x64,0x5a,
//!         0x12,0x2e,0x22,0xea,0x20,0x81,0x66,0x78,0xdf,0x02,0x96,0x7c,0x1b,0x23,0xbd,0x72}
//!
//! "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) gives an algorithm
//! (algorithm 3.74) to find k1 and k2 given k, such that k1 + k2 * lambda == k mod n, and k1
//! and k2 have a small size.
//! It relies on constants a1, b1, a2, b2. These constants for the value of lambda above are:
//!
//! - a1 =      {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15}
//! - b1 =     -{0xe4,0x43,0x7e,0xd6,0x01,0x0e,0x88,0x28,0x6f,0x54,0x7f,0xa9,0x0a,0xbf,0xe4,0xc3}
//! - a2 = {0x01,0x14,0xca,0x50,0xf7,0xa8,0xe2,0xf3,0xf6,0x57,0xc1,0x10,0x8d,0x9d,0x44,0xcf,0xd8}
//! - b2 =      {0x30,0x86,0xd2,0x21,0xa7,0xd4,0x6b,0xcd,0xe8,0x6c,0x90,0xe4,0x92,0x84,0xeb,0x15}
//!
//! The algorithm then computes c1 = round(b1 * k / n) and c2 = round(b2 * k / n), and gives
//! k1 = k - (c1*a1 + c2*a2) and k2 = -(c1*b1 + c2*b2). Instead, we use modular arithmetic, and
//! compute k1 as k - k2 * lambda, avoiding the need for constants a1 and a2.
//!
//! g1, g2 are precomputed constants used to replace division with a rounded multiplication
//! when decomposing the scalar for an endomorphism-based point multiplication.
//!
//! The possibility of using precomputed estimates is mentioned in "Guide to Elliptic Curve
//! Cryptography" (Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone) in section 3.5.
//!
//! The derivation is described in the paper "Efficient Software Implementation of Public-Key
//! Cryptography on Sensor Networks Using the MSP430X Microcontroller" (Gouvea, Oliveira, Lopez),
//! Section 4.3 (here we use a somewhat higher-precision estimate):
//! d = a1*b2 - b1*a2
//! g1 = round((2^272)*b2/d)
//! g2 = round((2^272)*b1/d)
//!
//! (Note that 'd' is also equal to the curve order here because [a1,b1] and [a2,b2] are found
//! as outputs of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm on inputs 'order' and 'lambda').
//!
//! @fjarri:
//!
//! To be precise, the method used here is based on "An Alternate Decomposition of an Integer for
//! Faster Point Multiplication on Certain Elliptic Curves" by Young-Ho Park, Sangtae Jeong,
//! Chang Han Kim, and Jongin Lim:
//! <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-45664-3_23>
//!
//! The precision used for `g1` and `g2` is not enough to ensure correct approximation at all times.
//! For example, `2^272 * b1 / n` used to calculate `g2` is rounded down.
//! This means that the approximation `z' = k * g2 / 2^272` always slightly underestimates
//! the real value `z = b1 * k / n`. Therefore, when the fractional part of `z` is just slightly
//! above 0.5, it will be rounded up, but `z'` will have the fractional part slightly below 0.5 and
//! will be rounded down.
//!
//! The difference `z - z' = k * delta / 2^272`, where `delta = b1 * 2^272 mod n`.
//! The closest `z` can get to the fractional part equal to .5 is `1 / (2n)` (since `n` is odd).
//! Therefore, to guarantee that `z'` will always be rounded to the same value, one must have
//! `delta / 2^m < 1 / (2n * (n - 1))`, where `m` is the power of 2 used for the approximation.
//! This means that one should use at least `m = 512` (since `0 < delta < 1`).
//! Indeed, tests show that with only `m = 272` the approximation produces off-by-1 errors
//! occasionally.
//!
//! Now since `r1` is calculated as `k - r2 * lambda mod n`, the contract
//! `r1 + r2 * lambda = k mod n` is always satisfied. The method guarantees both `r1` and `r2` to be
//! less than `sqrt(n)` (so, fit in 128 bits) if the rounding is applied correctly - but in our case
//! the off-by-1 errors will produce different `r1` and `r2` which are not necessarily bounded by
//! `sqrt(n)`.
//!
//! In experiments, I was not able to detect any case where they would go outside the 128 bit bound,
//! but I cannot be sure that it cannot happen.

use crate::arithmetic::{scalar::Scalar, ProjectivePoint};
use core::ops::{Mul, MulAssign};
use elliptic_curve::subtle::{Choice, ConditionallySelectable, ConstantTimeEq};

/// Lookup table containing precomputed values `[p, 2p, 3p, ..., 8p]`
struct LookupTable([ProjectivePoint; 8]);

impl From<&ProjectivePoint> for LookupTable {
    fn from(p: &ProjectivePoint) -> Self {
        let mut points = [*p; 8];
        for j in 0..7 {
            points[j + 1] = p + &points[j];
        }
        LookupTable(points)
    }
}

impl LookupTable {
    /// Given -8 <= x <= 8, returns x * p in constant time.
    pub fn select(&self, x: i8) -> ProjectivePoint {
        debug_assert!(x >= -8);
        debug_assert!(x <= 8);

        // Compute xabs = |x|
        let xmask = x >> 7;
        let xabs = (x + xmask) ^ xmask;

        // Get an array element in constant time
        let mut t = ProjectivePoint::identity();
        for j in 1..9 {
            let c = (xabs as u8).ct_eq(&(j as u8));
            t.conditional_assign(&self.0[j - 1], c);
        }
        // Now t == |x| * p.

        let neg_mask = Choice::from((xmask & 1) as u8);
        t.conditional_assign(&-t, neg_mask);
        // Now t == x * p.

        t
    }
}

const MINUS_LAMBDA: Scalar = Scalar::from_bytes_unchecked(&[
    0xac, 0x9c, 0x52, 0xb3, 0x3f, 0xa3, 0xcf, 0x1f, 0x5a, 0xd9, 0xe3, 0xfd, 0x77, 0xed, 0x9b, 0xa4,
    0xa8, 0x80, 0xb9, 0xfc, 0x8e, 0xc7, 0x39, 0xc2, 0xe0, 0xcf, 0xc8, 0x10, 0xb5, 0x12, 0x83, 0xcf,
]);

const MINUS_B1: Scalar = Scalar::from_bytes_unchecked(&[
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0xe4, 0x43, 0x7e, 0xd6, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x88, 0x28, 0x6f, 0x54, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x0a, 0xbf, 0xe4, 0xc3,
]);

const MINUS_B2: Scalar = Scalar::from_bytes_unchecked(&[
    0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe,
    0x8a, 0x28, 0x0a, 0xc5, 0x07, 0x74, 0x34, 0x6d, 0xd7, 0x65, 0xcd, 0xa8, 0x3d, 0xb1, 0x56, 0x2c,
]);

const G1: Scalar = Scalar::from_bytes_unchecked(&[
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x86,
    0xd2, 0x21, 0xa7, 0xd4, 0x6b, 0xcd, 0xe8, 0x6c, 0x90, 0xe4, 0x92, 0x84, 0xeb, 0x15, 0x3d, 0xab,
]);

const G2: Scalar = Scalar::from_bytes_unchecked(&[
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xe4, 0x43,
    0x7e, 0xd6, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x88, 0x28, 0x6f, 0x54, 0x7f, 0xa9, 0x0a, 0xbf, 0xe4, 0xc4, 0x22, 0x12,
]);

/// Find r1 and r2 given k, such that r1 + r2 * lambda == k mod n.
fn decompose_scalar(k: &Scalar) -> (Scalar, Scalar) {
    // these _var calls are constant time since the shift amount is constant
    let c1 = k.mul_shift_var(&G1, 272);
    let c2 = k.mul_shift_var(&G2, 272);

    let c1 = c1 * MINUS_B1;
    let c2 = c2 * MINUS_B2;
    let r2 = c1 + c2;
    let r1 = k + r2 * MINUS_LAMBDA;

    (r1, r2)
}

/// Returns `[a_0, ..., a_32]` such that `sum(a_j * 2^(j * 4)) == x`,
/// and `-8 <= a_j <= 7`.
/// Assumes `x < 2^128`.
fn to_radix_16_half(x: &Scalar) -> [i8; 33] {
    // `x` can have up to 256 bits, so we need an additional byte to store the carry.
    let mut output = [0i8; 33];

    // Step 1: change radix.
    // Convert from radix 256 (bytes) to radix 16 (nibbles)
    let bytes = x.to_bytes();
    for i in 0..16 {
        output[2 * i] = (bytes[31 - i] & 0xf) as i8;
        output[2 * i + 1] = ((bytes[31 - i] >> 4) & 0xf) as i8;
    }

    debug_assert!((x >> 128).is_zero().unwrap_u8() == 1);

    // Step 2: recenter coefficients from [0,16) to [-8,8)
    for i in 0..32 {
        let carry = (output[i] + 8) >> 4;
        output[i] -= carry << 4;
        output[i + 1] += carry;
    }

    output
}

fn mul_windowed(x: &ProjectivePoint, k: &Scalar) -> ProjectivePoint {
    let (r1, r2) = decompose_scalar(k);
    let x_beta = x.endomorphism();

    let r1_sign = r1.is_high();
    let r1_c = Scalar::conditional_select(&r1, &-r1, r1_sign);
    let r2_sign = r2.is_high();
    let r2_c = Scalar::conditional_select(&r2, &-r2, r2_sign);

    let table1 = LookupTable::from(&ProjectivePoint::conditional_select(x, &-x, r1_sign));
    let table2 = LookupTable::from(&ProjectivePoint::conditional_select(
        &x_beta, &-x_beta, r2_sign,
    ));

    let digits1 = to_radix_16_half(&r1_c);
    let digits2 = to_radix_16_half(&r2_c);

    let mut acc = table1.select(digits1[32]) + table2.select(digits2[32]);
    for i in (0..32).rev() {
        for _j in 0..4 {
            acc = acc.double();
        }

        acc += &table1.select(digits1[i]);
        acc += &table2.select(digits2[i]);
    }
    acc
}

impl Mul<Scalar> for ProjectivePoint {
    type Output = ProjectivePoint;

    fn mul(self, other: Scalar) -> ProjectivePoint {
        mul_windowed(&self, &other)
    }
}

impl Mul<&Scalar> for &ProjectivePoint {
    type Output = ProjectivePoint;

    fn mul(self, other: &Scalar) -> ProjectivePoint {
        mul_windowed(self, other)
    }
}

impl Mul<&Scalar> for ProjectivePoint {
    type Output = ProjectivePoint;

    fn mul(self, other: &Scalar) -> ProjectivePoint {
        mul_windowed(&self, other)
    }
}

impl MulAssign<Scalar> for ProjectivePoint {
    fn mul_assign(&mut self, rhs: Scalar) {
        *self = mul_windowed(self, &rhs);
    }
}

impl MulAssign<&Scalar> for ProjectivePoint {
    fn mul_assign(&mut self, rhs: &Scalar) {
        *self = mul_windowed(self, rhs);
    }
}