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//! ## Unaggreagated BLS signatures //! //! We simplify the code by using only the projective form as //! produced by algebraic operations, like aggregation, signing, and //! `SecretKey::into_public`, for both `Signature` and `Group`. //! //! In principle, one benifits from an affine form in serialization, //! and pairings meaning signature verification, but the conversion //! from affine to projective is always free and the converion from //! projective to affine is free if we do no algebraic operations. //! We thus expect the conversion to and from projective to be free //! in the case of verifications where staying affine yields the //! largest benifits. //! //! We imagine this simplification helps focus on more important //! optimizations, like placing `batch_normalization` calls well. //! We could exploit `CurveProjective::add_assign_mixed` function //! if we had seperate types for affine points, but if doing so //! improved performance enough then we instead suggest tweaking //! `CurveProjective::add_mixed` to test for normalized points. //! //! TODO: Add serde support for serialization throughout. See //! https://github.com/ebfull/pairing/pull/87#issuecomment-402397091 //! https://github.com/poanetwork/hbbft/blob/38178af1244ddeca27f9d23750ca755af6e886ee/src/crypto/serde_impl.rs#L95 use ff::{Field, PrimeField, PrimeFieldRepr, PrimeFieldDecodingError}; // ScalarEngine, SqrtField use pairing::{CurveAffine, CurveProjective, EncodedPoint, GroupDecodingError}; // Engine, PrimeField, SqrtField use rand::{Rng, thread_rng, SeedableRng, chacha::ChaChaRng}; // use rand::prelude::*; // ThreadRng,thread_rng // use rand_chacha::ChaChaRng; use sha3::{Shake128, digest::{Input,ExtendableOutput,XofReader}}; // use std::borrow::{Borrow,BorrowMut}; use std::iter::once; use std::io; use super::*; // //////////////// SECRETS //////////////// // /// Secret signing key lacking the side channel protections from /// key splitting. Avoid using directly in production. pub struct SecretKeyVT<E: EngineBLS>(pub E::Scalar); impl<E: EngineBLS> Clone for SecretKeyVT<E> { fn clone(&self) -> Self { SecretKeyVT(self.0) } } // TODO: Serialization impl<E: EngineBLS> SecretKeyVT<E> { /// Convert our secret key to its representation type, which /// satisfies both `AsRef<[u64]>` and `ff::PrimeFieldRepr`. /// We suggest `ff::PrimeFieldRepr::write_le` for serialization, /// invoked by our `write` method. pub fn to_repr(&self) -> <E::Scalar as PrimeField>::Repr { self.0.into_repr() } pub fn write<W: io::Write>(&self, writer: W) -> io::Result<()> { self.to_repr().write_le(writer) } /// Convert our secret key from its representation type, which /// satisfies `Default`, `AsMut<[u64]>`, and `ff::PrimeFieldRepr`. /// We suggest `ff::PrimeFieldRepr::read_le` for deserialization, /// invoked via our `read` method, which requires a seperate call. pub fn from_repr(repr: <E::Scalar as PrimeField>::Repr) -> Result<Self,PrimeFieldDecodingError> { Ok(SecretKeyVT(<E::Scalar as PrimeField>::from_repr(repr) ?)) } pub fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: R) -> io::Result<<E::Scalar as PrimeField>::Repr> { let mut repr = <E::Scalar as PrimeField>::Repr::default(); repr.read_le(reader) ?; Ok(repr) } /// Generate a secret key without side channel protections. pub fn generate<R: Rng>(mut rng: R) -> Self { SecretKeyVT( E::generate(&mut rng) ) } /// Sign without side channel protections from key mutation. pub fn sign(&self, message: Message) -> Signature<E> { let mut s = message.hash_to_signature_curve::<E>(); s.mul_assign(self.0); // s.normalize(); // VRFs are faster if we only normalize once, but no normalize method exists. // E::SignatureGroup::batch_normalization(&mut [&mut s]); Signature(s) } /// Convert into a `SecretKey` that supports side channel protections, /// but does not itself resplit the key. pub fn into_split_dirty(&self) -> SecretKey<E> { SecretKey { key: [ self.0.clone(), E::Scalar::zero() ], old_unsigned: E::SignatureGroup::zero(), old_signed: E::SignatureGroup::zero(), } } /// Convert into a `SecretKey` applying side channel protections. pub fn into_split<R: Rng>(&self, mut rng: R) -> SecretKey<E> { let mut s = self.into_split_dirty(); s.resplit(&mut rng); s.init_point_mutation(rng); s } /// Derive our public key from our secret key pub fn into_public(&self) -> PublicKey<E> { // TODO str4d never decided on projective vs affine here, so benchmark both versions. PublicKey( <E::PublicKeyGroup as CurveProjective>::Affine::one().mul(self.0) ) // let mut g = <E::PublicKeyGroup as CurveProjective>::one(); // g.mul_assign(self.0); // PublicKey(p) } } /// Secret signing key that is split to provide side channel protection. /// /// A simple key splitting works because /// `self.key[0] * H(message) + self.key[1] * H(message) = (self.key[0] + self.key[1]) * H(message)`. /// In our case, we mutate the point being signed too by keeping /// an old point in both signed and unsigned forms, so our message /// point becomes `new_unsigned = H(message) - old_unsigned`, /// we compute `new_signed = self.key[0] * new_unsigned + self.key[1] * new_unsigned`, /// and our signature becomes `new_signed + old_signed`. /// We save the new signed and unsigned values as old ones, so that adversaries /// also cannot know the curves points being multiplied by scalars. /// In this, our `init_point_mutation` method signs some random point, /// so that even an adversary who tracks all signed messages cannot /// foresee the curve points being signed. /// /// We require mutable access to the secret key, but interior mutability /// can easily be employed, which might resemble: /// ```rust,no_run /// # extern crate bls_like as bls; /// # extern crate rand; /// # use bls::{SecretKey,ZBLS,Message}; /// # use rand::thread_rng; /// # let message = Message::new(b"ctx",b"test message"); /// let mut secret = ::std::cell::RefCell::new(SecretKey::<ZBLS>::generate(thread_rng())); /// let signature = secret.borrow_mut().sign(message,thread_rng()); /// ``` /// If however `secret: Mutex<SecretKey>` or `secret: RwLock<SecretKey>` /// then one might avoid holding the write lock while signing, or even /// while sampling the random numbers by using other methods. /// /// Right now, we serialize using `SecretKey::into_vartime` and /// `SecretKeyVT::write`, so `secret.into_vartime().write(writer)?`. /// We deserialize using the `read`, `from_repr`, and `into_split` /// methods of `SecretKeyVT`, so roughly /// `SecretKeyVT::from_repr(SecretKeyVT::read(reader) ?) ?.into_split(thread_rng())`. /// /// TODO: Provide sensible `to_bytes` and `from_bytes` methods /// for `ZBLS` and `TinyBLS<..>`. /// /// TODO: Is Pippenger’s algorithm, or another fast MSM algorithm, /// secure when used with key splitting? pub struct SecretKey<E: EngineBLS> { key: [E::Scalar; 2], old_unsigned: E::SignatureGroup, old_signed: E::SignatureGroup, } impl<E: EngineBLS> Clone for SecretKey<E> { fn clone(&self) -> Self { SecretKey { key: self.key.clone(), old_unsigned: self.old_unsigned.clone(), old_signed: self.old_signed.clone(), } } } // TODO: Serialization impl<E: EngineBLS> SecretKey<E> { /// Initialize the signature curve signed point mutation. /// /// Amortized over many signings involing this once costs /// nothing, but each individual invokation costs as much /// as signing. pub fn init_point_mutation<R: Rng>(&mut self, mut rng: R) { let mut s = rng.gen::<E::SignatureGroup>(); self.old_unsigned = s; self.old_signed = s; self.old_signed.mul_assign(self.key[0]); s.mul_assign(self.key[1]); self.old_signed.add_assign(&s); } /// Generate a secret key that is already split for side channel protection, /// but does not apply signed point mutation. pub fn generate_dirty<R: Rng>(mut rng: R) -> Self { SecretKey { key: [ E::generate(&mut rng), E::generate(&mut rng) ], old_unsigned: E::SignatureGroup::zero(), old_signed: E::SignatureGroup::zero(), } } /// Generate a secret key that is already split for side channel protection. pub fn generate<R: Rng>(mut rng: R) -> Self { let mut s = Self::generate_dirty(&mut rng); s.init_point_mutation(rng); s } /// Create a representative usable for operations lacking /// side channel protections. pub fn into_vartime(&self) -> SecretKeyVT<E> { let mut secret = self.key[0].clone(); secret.add_assign(&self.key[1]); SecretKeyVT(secret) } /// Randomly adjust how we split our secret signing key. // // An initial call to this function after deserialization or // `into_split_dirty` incurs a miniscule risk from side channel // attacks, but then protects the highly vulnerable signing // operations. `into_split` itself hjandles this. #[inline(never)] pub fn resplit<R: Rng>(&mut self, mut rng: R) { // resplit_with(|| Ok(self), rng).unwrap(); let x = E::generate(&mut rng); self.key[0].add_assign(&x); self.key[1].sub_assign(&x); } /// Sign without doing the key resplit mutation that provides side channel protection. /// /// Avoid using directly without appropriate `replit` calls, but maybe /// useful in proof-of-concenpt code, as it does not require a mutable /// secret key. pub fn sign_once(&mut self, message: Message) -> Signature<E> { let mut z = message.hash_to_signature_curve::<E>(); z.sub_assign(&self.old_unsigned); self.old_unsigned = z.clone(); let mut t = z.clone(); t.mul_assign(self.key[0]); z.mul_assign(self.key[1]); z.add_assign(&t); let old_signed = self.old_signed.clone(); self.old_signed = z.clone(); z.add_assign(&old_signed); // s.normalize(); // VRFs are faster if we only normalize once, but no normalize method exists. // E::SignatureGroup::batch_normalization(&mut [&mut s]); Signature(z) } /// Sign after respliting the secret key for side channel protections. pub fn sign<R: Rng>(&mut self, message: Message, rng: R) -> Signature<E> { self.resplit(rng); self.sign_once(message) } /// Derive our public key from our secret key /// /// We do not resplit for side channel protections here since /// this call should be rare. pub fn into_public(&self) -> PublicKey<E> { let generator = <E::PublicKeyGroup as CurveProjective>::Affine::one(); let mut publickey = generator.mul(self.key[0]); publickey.add_assign( & generator.mul(self.key[1]) ); PublicKey(publickey) // TODO str4d never decided on projective vs affine here, so benchmark this. /* let mut x = <E::PublicKeyGroup as CurveProjective>::one(); x.mul_assign(self.0); let y = <E::PublicKeyGroup as CurveProjective>::one(); y.mul_assign(self.1); x.add_assign(&y); PublicKey(x) */ } } // ////////////// NON-SECRETS ////////////// // // /////// BEGIN MACROS /////// // /* TODO: Requires specilizatin macro_rules! borrow_wrapper { ($wrapper:tt,$wrapped:tt,$var:tt) => { impl<E: EngineBLS> Borrow<E::$wrapped> for $wrapper<E> { borrow(&self) -> &E::$wrapped { &self.$var } } impl<E: EngineBLS> BorrowMut<E::$wrapped> for $wrapper<E> { borrow_mut(&self) -> &E::$wrapped { &self.$var } } } } // macro_rules! */ macro_rules! broken_derives { ($wrapper:tt) => { impl<E: EngineBLS> Clone for $wrapper<E> { fn clone(&self) -> Self { $wrapper(self.0) } } impl<E: EngineBLS> Copy for $wrapper<E> { } impl<E: EngineBLS> PartialEq<Self> for $wrapper<E> { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { self.0.eq(&other.0) } } impl <E: EngineBLS> Eq for $wrapper<E> {} } } // macro_rules! #[cfg(feature = "serde")] fn serde_error_from_group_decoding_error(err: GroupDecodingError) -> ::serde::de::Error { match err { GroupDecodingError::NotOnCurve => E::custom("Point not on curve"), GroupDecodingError::NotInSubgroup => E::custom("Point not in prime order subgroup"), GroupDecodingError::CoordinateDecodingError(_s, _pfde) // Ignore PrimeFieldDecodingError => E::custom("Coordinate decoding error"), GroupDecodingError::UnexpectedCompressionMode => E::custom("Unexpected compression mode"), GroupDecodingError::UnexpectedInformation => E::custom("Invalid length or other unexpected information"), } } macro_rules! compression { ($wrapper:tt,$group:tt) => { impl<E: EngineBLS> $wrapper<E> { /// Convert our signature or public key type to its compressed form. /// /// These compressed forms are wraper types on either a `[u8; 48]` /// or `[u8; 96]` which satisfy `pairing::EncodedPoint` and permit /// read access with `AsRef<[u8]>`. pub fn compress(&self) -> <<<E as EngineBLS>::$group as CurveProjective>::Affine as CurveAffine>::Compressed { self.0.into_affine().into_compressed() } /// Decompress our signature or public key type from its compressed form. /// /// These compressed forms are wraper types on either a `[u8; 48]` /// or `[u8; 96]` which satisfy `pairing::EncodedPoint` and permit /// creation and write access with `pairing::EncodedPoint::empty()` /// and `AsMef<[u8]>`, respectively. pub fn decompress(compressed: <<<E as EngineBLS>::$group as CurveProjective>::Affine as CurveAffine>::Compressed) -> Result<Self,GroupDecodingError> { Ok($wrapper(compressed.into_affine()?.into_projective())) } pub fn decompress_from_slice(slice: &[u8]) -> Result<Self,GroupDecodingError> { let mut compressed = <<<E as EngineBLS>::$group as CurveProjective>::Affine as CurveAffine>::Compressed::empty(); if slice.len() != compressed.as_mut().len() { // We should ideally return our own error here, but this seems acceptable for now. return Err(GroupDecodingError::UnexpectedInformation); } // <<<E as EngineBLS>::$group as CurveProjective>::Affine as CurveAffine>::Compressed::size() compressed.as_mut().copy_from_slice(slice); $wrapper::<E>::decompress(compressed) } } #[cfg(feature = "serde")] impl<E: EngineBLS> ::serde::Serialize for $wrapper<E> { fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error> where S: ::serde::Serializer { serializer.serialize_bytes(self.compress().as_ref()) } } #[cfg(feature = "serde")] impl<'a,E: EngineBLS> ::serde::Deserialize<'d> for $wrapper<E> { fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error> where D: ::serde::Deserializer<'d> { struct MyVisitor; impl<'d> ::serde::de::Visitor<'d> for MyVisitor { type Value = $wrapper<E>; fn expecting(&self, formatter: &mut ::core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> ::core::fmt::Result { formatter.write_str(Self::Value::DESCRIPTION) } fn visit_bytes<E>(self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<$wrapper<E>, E> where E: ::serde::de::Error { $wrapper::<E>::decompress_from_slice(bytes) .map_err(serde_error_from_signature_error) } } deserializer.deserialize_bytes(MyVisitor) } } } } // macro_rules! macro_rules! zbls_serialization { ($wrapper:tt,$orientation:tt,$size:expr) => { impl $wrapper<$orientation<::pairing::bls12_381::Bls12>> { pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> [u8; $size] { let mut bytes = [0u8; $size]; bytes.copy_from_slice(self.compress().as_ref()); bytes } pub fn from_bytes(bytes: [u8; $size]) -> Result<Self,GroupDecodingError> { $wrapper::<$orientation<::pairing::bls12_381::Bls12>>::decompress_from_slice(&bytes[..]) } } } } // macro_rules! // //////// END MACROS //////// // /// Detached BLS Signature #[derive(Debug)] pub struct Signature<E: EngineBLS>(pub E::SignatureGroup); // TODO: Serialization broken_derives!(Signature); // Actually the derive works for this one, not sure why. // borrow_wrapper!(Signature,SignatureGroup,0); compression!(Signature,SignatureGroup); zbls_serialization!(Signature,UsualBLS,96); zbls_serialization!(Signature,TinyBLS,48); impl<E: EngineBLS> Signature<E> { /// Verify a single BLS signature pub fn verify(&self, message: Message, publickey: &PublicKey<E>) -> bool { let publickey = publickey.0.into_affine().prepare(); // TODO: Bentchmark these two variants // Variant 1. Do not batch any normalizations let message = message.hash_to_signature_curve::<E>().into_affine().prepare(); let signature = self.0.into_affine().prepare(); // Variant 2. Batch signature curve normalizations // let mut s = [E::hash_to_signature_curve(message), signature.0]; // E::SignatureCurve::batch_normalization(&s); // let message = s[0].into_affine().prepare(); // let signature = s[1].into_affine().prepare(); // TODO: Compare benchmarks on variants E::verify_prepared( & signature, once((&publickey,&message)) ) } } /// BLS Public Key #[derive(Debug)] pub struct PublicKey<E: EngineBLS>(pub E::PublicKeyGroup); // TODO: Serialization broken_derives!(PublicKey); // borrow_wrapper!(PublicKey,PublicKeyGroup,0); compression!(PublicKey,PublicKeyGroup); zbls_serialization!(PublicKey,UsualBLS,48); zbls_serialization!(PublicKey,TinyBLS,96); impl<E: EngineBLS> PublicKey<E> { pub fn verify(&self, message: Message, signature: &Signature<E>) -> bool { signature.verify(message,self) } } /// BLS Keypair /// /// We create `Signed` messages with a `Keypair` to avoid recomputing /// the public key, which usually takes longer than signing when /// the public key group is `G2`. /// /// We provide constant-time signing using key splitting. pub struct KeypairVT<E: EngineBLS> { pub secret: SecretKeyVT<E>, pub public: PublicKey<E>, } impl<E: EngineBLS> Clone for KeypairVT<E> { fn clone(&self) -> Self { KeypairVT { secret: self.secret.clone(), public: self.public.clone(), } } } // TODO: Serialization impl<E: EngineBLS> KeypairVT<E> { /// Generate a `Keypair` pub fn generate<R: Rng>(rng: R) -> Self { let secret = SecretKeyVT::generate(rng); let public = secret.into_public(); KeypairVT { secret, public } } /// Convert into a `SecretKey` applying side channel protections. pub fn into_split<R: Rng>(&self, rng: R) -> Keypair<E> { let secret = self.secret.into_split(rng); let public = self.public; Keypair { secret, public } } /// Sign a message creating a `SignedMessage` using a user supplied CSPRNG for the key splitting. pub fn sign(&self, message: Message) -> SignedMessage<E> { let signature = self.secret.sign(message); SignedMessage { message, publickey: self.public.clone(), signature, } } } /// BLS Keypair /// /// We create `Signed` messages with a `Keypair` to avoid recomputing /// the public key, which usually takes longer than signing when /// the public key group is `G2`. /// /// We provide constant-time signing using key splitting. pub struct Keypair<E: EngineBLS> { pub secret: SecretKey<E>, pub public: PublicKey<E>, } impl<E: EngineBLS> Clone for Keypair<E> { fn clone(&self) -> Self { Keypair { secret: self.secret.clone(), public: self.public.clone(), } } } // TODO: Serialization impl<E: EngineBLS> Keypair<E> { /// Generate a `Keypair` pub fn generate<R: Rng>(rng: R) -> Self { let secret = SecretKey::generate(rng); let public = secret.into_public(); Keypair { secret, public } } /// Create a representative usable for operations lacking /// side channel protections. pub fn into_vartime(&self) -> KeypairVT<E> { let secret = self.secret.into_vartime(); let public = self.public; KeypairVT { secret, public } } /// Sign a message creating a `SignedMessage` using a user supplied CSPRNG for the key splitting. pub fn sign_with_rng<R: Rng>(&mut self, message: Message, rng: R) -> SignedMessage<E> { let signature = self.secret.sign(message,rng); SignedMessage { message, publickey: self.public, signature, } } /// Create a `SignedMessage` using the default `ThreadRng`. pub fn sign(&mut self, message: Message) -> SignedMessage<E> { self.sign_with_rng(message,thread_rng()) } } /// Message with attached BLS signature /// /// #[derive(Debug,Clone)] pub struct SignedMessage<E: EngineBLS> { pub message: Message, pub publickey: PublicKey<E>, pub signature: Signature<E>, } // TODO: Serialization // borrow_wrapper!(Signature,SignatureGroup,signature); // borrow_wrapper!(PublicKey,PublicKeyGroup,publickey); impl<E: EngineBLS> PartialEq<Self> for SignedMessage<E> { fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool { self.message.eq(&other.message) && self.publickey.eq(&other.publickey) && self.signature.eq(&other.signature) } } impl <E: EngineBLS> Eq for SignedMessage<E> {} impl<'a,E: EngineBLS> Signed for &'a SignedMessage<E> { type E = E; type M = Message; type PKG = PublicKey<E>; type PKnM = ::std::iter::Once<(Message, PublicKey<E>)>; fn messages_and_publickeys(self) -> Self::PKnM { once((self.message.clone(), self.publickey)) // TODO: Avoid clone } fn signature(&self) -> Signature<E> { self.signature } fn verify(self) -> bool { self.signature.verify(self.message, &self.publickey) } } impl<E: EngineBLS> SignedMessage<E> { #[cfg(test)] fn verify_slow(&self) -> bool { let g1_one = <E::PublicKeyGroup as CurveProjective>::Affine::one(); let message = self.message.hash_to_signature_curve::<E>().into_affine(); E::pairing(g1_one, self.signature.0.into_affine()) == E::pairing(self.publickey.0.into_affine(), message) } /// Hash output from a BLS signature regarded as a VRF. /// /// If you are not the signer then you must verify the VRF before calling this method. /// /// If called with distinct contexts then outputs should be independent. /// /// We incorporate both the input and output to provide the 2Hash-DH /// construction from Theorem 2 on page 32 in appendex C of /// ["Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake blockchain"](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf) /// by Bernardo David, Peter Gazi, Aggelos Kiayias, and Alexander Russell. pub fn vrf_hash<H: Input>(&self, h: &mut H) { h.input(b"msg"); h.input(&self.message.0[..]); h.input(b"out"); h.input(self.signature.0.into_affine().into_uncompressed().as_ref()); } /// Raw bytes output from a BLS signature regarded as a VRF. /// /// If you are not the signer then you must verify the VRF before calling this method. /// /// If called with distinct contexts then outputs should be independent. pub fn make_bytes<Out: Default + AsMut<[u8]>>(&self, context: &[u8]) -> Out { let mut t = Shake128::default(); t.input(context); self.vrf_hash(&mut t); let mut seed = Out::default(); t.xof_result().read(seed.as_mut()); seed } /* TODO: Switch to this whenever pairing upgrades to rand 0.5 or later /// VRF output converted into any `SeedableRng`. /// /// If you are not the signer then you must verify the VRF before calling this method. /// /// We expect most users would prefer the less generic `VRFInOut::make_chacharng` method. pub fn make_rng<R: SeedableRng>(&self, context: &[u8]) -> R { R::from_seed(self.make_bytes::<R::Seed>(context)) } */ /// VRF output converted into a `ChaChaRng`. /// /// If you are not the signer then you must verify the VRF before calling this method. /// /// If called with distinct contexts then outputs should be independent. /// Independent output streams are available via `ChaChaRng::set_stream` too. /// /// We incorporate both the input and output to provide the 2Hash-DH /// construction from Theorem 2 on page 32 in appendex C of /// ["Ouroboros Praos: An adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake blockchain"](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/573.pdf) /// by Bernardo David, Peter Gazi, Aggelos Kiayias, and Alexander Russell. pub fn make_chacharng(&self, context: &[u8]) -> ChaChaRng { // self.make_rng::<ChaChaRng>(context) // TODO: Remove this ugly hack whenever rand gets updated to 0.5 or later let bytes = self.make_bytes::<[u8;32]>(context); let mut words = [0u32; 8]; for (w,bs) in words.iter_mut().zip(bytes.chunks(4)) { let mut b = [0u8; 4]; b.copy_from_slice(bs); *w = u32::from_le_bytes(b); } ChaChaRng::from_seed(&words) } } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use super::*; fn zbls_usual_bytes_test(x: SignedMessage<ZBLS>) -> SignedMessage<ZBLS> { let SignedMessage { message, publickey, signature } = x; let publickey = PublicKey::<ZBLS>::from_bytes(publickey.to_bytes()).unwrap(); let signature = Signature::<ZBLS>::from_bytes(signature.to_bytes()).unwrap(); SignedMessage { message, publickey, signature } } pub type TBLS = TinyBLS<::pairing::bls12_381::Bls12>; fn zbls_tiny_bytes_test(x: SignedMessage<TBLS>) -> SignedMessage<TBLS> { let SignedMessage { message, publickey, signature } = x; let publickey = PublicKey::<TBLS>::from_bytes(publickey.to_bytes()).unwrap(); let signature = Signature::<TBLS>::from_bytes(signature.to_bytes()).unwrap(); SignedMessage { message, publickey, signature } } #[test] fn single_messages() { let good = Message::new(b"ctx",b"test message"); let mut keypair = Keypair::<ZBLS>::generate(thread_rng()); let good_sig = zbls_usual_bytes_test(keypair.sign(good)); assert!(good_sig.verify_slow()); let keypair_vt = keypair.into_vartime(); assert!( keypair_vt.secret.0 == keypair_vt.into_split(thread_rng()).into_vartime().secret.0 ); assert!( good_sig == keypair.sign(good) ); assert!( good_sig == keypair_vt.sign(good) ); let bad = Message::new(b"ctx",b"wrong message"); let bad_sig = zbls_usual_bytes_test(keypair.sign(bad)); assert!( bad_sig == keypair.into_vartime().sign(bad) ); assert!( bad_sig.verify() ); let another = Message::new(b"ctx",b"another message"); let another_sig = keypair.sign(another); assert!( another_sig == keypair.into_vartime().sign(another) ); assert!( another_sig.verify() ); assert!(keypair.public.verify(good, &good_sig.signature), "Verification of a valid signature failed!"); assert!(!keypair.public.verify(good, &bad_sig.signature), "Verification of a signature on a different message passed!"); assert!(!keypair.public.verify(bad, &good_sig.signature), "Verification of a signature on a different message passed!"); assert!(!keypair.public.verify(Message::new(b"other",b"test message"), &good_sig.signature), "Verification of a signature on a different message passed!"); } }